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Notes
“DIVINE” JUSTICE AND THE LACK OF
SECULAR INTERVENTION: ABROGATING
THE CLERGY-COMMUNICANT PRIVILEGE IN
MANDATORY REPORTING STATUTES TO
COMBAT CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
“Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any
particular sect may designate as religion.”1
Imagine two loving parents at the airport, anxiously awaiting the
return of their sixteen-year-old daughter from a yearlong mission trip to
the Philippine Islands. Picture their excitement as they look for their
young, vivacious daughter to step off the plane from the terminal
window. Now imagine their shock when they see the once bright-eyed
girl walking toward them with dull, lifeless eyes and a sickly physique.
Envision this weak looking child carrying a newborn infant in her arms.
The array of emotions these parents undoubtedly experience as a result
of this unexpected situation is great, but try picturing the amount of
outrage and devastation they feel when they discover that their church
leaders lied to them and sent their daughter on this mission trip to
conceal her pregnancy. Imagine their feelings of betrayal to learn that
more than seven revered spiritual leaders had been regularly coaxing
their daughter into sexual intercourse under the guise of being
religiously permissive and ethically wise. Visualize these parents’ anger
when they learn that the church leaders failed to uphold their promise to
provide adequate financial support for their daughter while away,
resulting in her suffering malnutrition and being near death during
childbirth.
Try conceiving their astonishment and feelings of
abandonment when the seven errant clergymen and their informed
superiors are left unpunished and free to prey on other unsuspecting
children and families.2

PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 24 (1962).
This hypothetical situation is based on the case of Rita M. v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
1
2
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Situations like the preceding hypothetical are not unique. The
United States is facing a pandemic of child sexual abuse.3 Surprisingly,
however, only about ten percent of reported cases of sexual abuse on
minors are alleged to have been perpetrated by a stranger.4 Instead,
abuse is typically perpetrated by a family member, friend, or other
known and trusted individual, such as a clergyman.5 Consequently, the
tragedy and horror of sexual abuse is found not only in the home, but
also in the church.6
The government has a strong interest in preventing child abuse in all
forms, regardless of the perpetrator’s relationship with the victim.7 Yet,
3
National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Sexual Violence: Fact Sheet,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/svfacts.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2007) [hereinafter
National Center]; Darkness to Light, Statistics Surrounding Child Sexual Abuse,
http://www.darkness2light.org/KnowAbout/statistics_2.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2007)
[hereinafter Darkness]. Nearly one in four girls and one in six boys are sexually abused
before the age of eighteen, with the median age being nine. Darkness, supra. Fifty-four
percent of all rapes on women transpire before they reach age eighteen, with twenty-two
percent of these rapes occurring before age twelve, while seventy-five percent of rapes on
men take place prior to their eighteenth birthday, with forty-eight percent of these
occurring before age twelve. National Center, supra. Child protective service agencies
confirmed that approximately two out of every one thousand children in the United States
experienced sexual assaults in 2003. Id. One in five children are sexually solicited over the
internet. Darkness, supra. Nearly seventy percent of all reported sexual assaults, including
those on adults, occur on children seventeen and younger, and more than twenty percent
of those children are sexually assaulted before age eight. Id. “An estimated . . . [thirtynine] million survivors of childhood sexual abuse exist in America today.” Id.
4
Id. Roughly thirty to forty percent of victims were abused by a family member and
another fifty percent by a trusted non-relative, thus leaving only ten percent of abuse
conducted by strangers. Id. “In 1997, parents and other caretakers committed one fifth of
all violent crimes against children seventeen and under.” Heather Rushing Potter,
Comment, Confidentiality in Mediation and the Duty to Report Child Abuse, 29 J. LEGAL PROF.
269 (2004-2005). However, “[a] vast majority of child abuse cases are never reported, and,
many times, deaths resulting from child abuse are never reported as such.” Id.
5
See supra note 4 (reporting how nearly ninety percent of all child sexual abuse crimes
are perpetrated by an individual known or trusted by the victim).
6
Secrecy, a lack of reporting, and inadequate record keeping have made ascertaining
the extent and nature of the sexual abuse impossible. Ruth Jones, The Extrajudicial
Resolution of Sexual Abuse Cases: Can the Church be a Resource for Survivors?, 38 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 351, 352 (2005). Roman Catholic Church officials alone received 1,092 allegations of
sexual abuse on minors in 2004 and 783 in 2005. Tara Dooley, Fewer Church Abuse Claims
Found, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 31, 2006, at B3. Additionally, a recent survey commissioned by
the United States Conference of Bishops, known as the John Jay Survey, estimated that
abuse within the Catholic Church affected more than ninety-five percent of dioceses and
approximately sixty percent of religious communities. Jones, supra, at 353.
7
See Darkness, supra note 4 (stating how, given that most perpetrators are recidivistic if
they are not reported and stopped, the government’s interest in eliminating child sexual
abuse and punishing those who perpetrate it is undoubtedly compelling). Of child sex
offenders, nearly seventy percent have between one and nine victims, and at least twenty
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despite this concern, the state often hesitates before acting on accusations
of abuse within religious communities or by religious leaders, partially
due to the constitutional dictates demanding separation of church and
state.8 Thus far, the state has been content to abstain from intervening by
allowing the individual organization to confront the abuse in accordance
with its own rules and practices.9 Such passivity is socially unacceptable
and ineffective at resolving child sexual abuse.
The criminal justice system has begun making changes to
accommodate sexually abused minors; however, as this Note suggests,
more aggressive changes are necessary.10 Because cases cannot be tried
until they are reported and investigated, this Note recommends that
states universally abrogate the clergy-communicant privilege in relation
to already existing mandatory reporting statutes in order to ensure that
all complaints or allegations of indecent sexual acts on children are
brought to the attention of the appropriate government agency. Hence,
Part II of this Note will present the manner by which several religious
institutions internally handle sexual abuse allegations and will illustrate
some of the deficiencies within the current criminal justice system.11 Part
II also provides a discussion of the constitutional restraints on
government action via the First Amendment, current mandatory
reporting statutes, and the clergy-communicant privilege.12 Part III will
percent have between ten and forty victims. Id. The average serial child sexual abuser may
have upwards of four hundred victims in his (or her) lifetime. Id.
8
See infra Part II.B (discussing Religion Clause jurisprudence).
9
Constance Frisby Fain & Herbert Fain, Sexual Abuse and the Church, 31 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 209, 211 (2006). “[S]exual abuse by clergypersons has been historically ignored and
hidden to a great extent . . . .” Id.
10
Judges have already begun “alter[ing] time-honored practices to accommodate
children in court.” John E. B. Myers, Susan E. Diedrich, Devon Lee, Kelly Fincher & Rachel
M. Stern, Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse in the United States, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE: HISTORICAL, LEGAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 57 (Jon R. Conte ed.,
2002). Examples of such accommodations are: the witness chair being turned slightly away
from the accused, not mandating that a child look directly at the accused when answering
prosecutor’s questions, giving more discretion to the judge as to whether or not to close the
proceedings or prohibit courtroom spectators when the child is testifying, granting regular
breaks for the child when testifying, permitting judges to control the line of questioning so
as to make questions more comprehensible to the child, allowing the child to be
accompanied by a “supportive adult[,]” and, in some circumstances, permitting a child to
“testify via closed-circuit television, outside the physical presence of the accused” (which
was determined not to be in violation of the defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation
with the witnesses against him in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)). Id. at 57-58.
11
See infra Part II.A (demonstrating how some religious institutions internally approach
the issue of child sexual abuse and the criminal justice system’s response thereto).
12
See infra Parts II.B-II.D (discussing the history of Religion Clause jurisprudence, the
mandatory reporting statute, and the clergy-communicant privilege).
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then analyze mandatory reporting statutes in relation to Religion Clause
jurisprudence and the feasibility of abrogating the clergy-communicant
privilege as a potential government recourse for the sexual abuse
dilemma in the church.13 Part IV will offer a model mandatory reporting
statute abrogating the clergy-communicant privilege.14
II. BACKGROUND
The crime of child sexual abuse has infiltrated all places that, in an
ideal world, would shelter and protect minors—from the homestead to
the school to the church.15 Innovative measures, such as abrogating the
clergy-communicant privilege, are necessary so that law enforcement
agencies can effectively combat the child abuse problem and secure the
safety of minors.16 Thus, Part II.A first explores some of the internal
polices practiced by the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of LatterDay Saints, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Amish in confronting
allegations of child abuse.17 Then, Part II.B addresses the history of the
Religion Clause jurisprudence, looking first at the Free Exercise Clause
and then the Establishment Clause.18 Next, Part II.C of this Note briefly
examines the history, purpose, and types of mandatory reporting
statutes.19 Lastly, Part II.D discusses the clergy-communicant privilege
and the different approaches states take in the context of criminal
prosecutions.20
A. Internal Religious Policies in Regard to Child Abuse Exercised Under the
Principle of Freedom of Religion and Illustrations of the Government’s
Responses
Religious institutions often receive exemptions from generally
applicable laws.21 Such exemptions are seen as a means to protect
See infra Part III (stating that the abrogation of the clergy-communicant privilege is
socially acceptable and constitutionally viable under the First Amendment).
14
See infra Part IV (presenting a model mandatory reporting statute abrogating the
clergy-communicant privilege).
15
See supra notes 3-4 (presenting statistics illustrating the widespread nature of the child
sexual abuse epidemic).
16
See infra Part III.B (discussing the necessity for abrogating the clergy communicant
privilege as a method of combating child sexual abuse).
17
See infra Part II.A.
18
See infra Part II.B.
19
See infra Part II.C.
20
See infra Part II.D.
21
Diana B. Henriques, Religion Trumps Regulation As Legal Exemptions Grow: From Day
Care Centers to Zoning Laws, Rules Don’t Apply to Faith Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at A1
(stating “such organizations—from mainline Presbyterian and Methodist churches to
13
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religious freedom under the First Amendment.22 However, according to
some scholars and lawmakers, “separation of church and state is no
longer the law of the land.”23 While the exemptions that these scholars
are referring to generally fall under areas of civil concern, religious
institutions are typically allowed to conduct themselves in accordance
with the same practices and principles they have used for centuries
when dealing with such criminal issues as child abuse.24 Ambiguity
concerning what government actions are constitutionally permissible
under the Religion Clauses often shields religious institutions from the
government enacting legislation that would encroach upon an
institutional practice.25 These internal policies often include methods for
mosques to synagogues to Hindu temples—enjoy an abundance of exemptions from
regulations and taxes. And the number is multiplying rapidly.”).
[S]ince 1989 . . . more than 200 special arrangements, protections or
exemptions for religious groups or their adherents were tucked in
Congressional legislation, covering topics ranging from pensions to
immigration to land use. . . . The special breaks amount to ‘‘a sort of
religious affirmative action program . . . .
Id. at 22.
22
See Henriques, supra note 21, at 22. “Some legal scholars and judges see the special
breaks for religious groups as a way to prevent government from infringing on those
religious freedoms.” Id. See generally Employment Div. Dep’t. of Human Res. of Oregon v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that generally applicable, neutral laws can be upheld
against religious practices without a Free Exercise violation). See also infra Part II.B
(discussing the scope of religious freedom under the Religion Clauses).
23
Henriques, supra note 21, at 22. “The Court has asserted that the objective of the
Establishment Clause is total separation [of church and state] while acknowledging that, in
our complex society, total separation is not possible.” Patricia Diann Long, Does the Wall
Still Stand?: Separation of Church and State in the United States, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 755, 755
(1985). The “wall” is “a flexible rather than a fixed wall.” Id.; see also Laurie Messerly,
Reviving Religious Liberty in America, 8 NEXUS 151, 159 (2003) (referring to the “mythological
‘wall of separation’ between church and state”) (emphasis added).
24
B.A. Robinson, Jehovah’s Witnesses (WTS) Policies & Examples of Child Sexual Abuse,
Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, Jan. 23, 2007, http://www.religioustolerance.
org/witness7.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007) [hereinafter WTS Policies] (“Every religious
institution develops their own policies and regulations concerning accusations of child
sexual and physical abuse.”). See also 91 AM. JUR. TRIALS 151 § 3 (2006). “We, as a culture,
have historically trusted the churches to handle . . . [sexual abuse] themselves and they
have coveted their right to do so.” Id. at § 7.
25
See infra Part II.B (discussing the Religion Clause jurisprudence). As the problem of
child sexual abuse in the religious community becomes more prevalent, it becomes evident
that the epidemic of child sexual abuse within the church needs to be addressed more by
the state. See Christine A. Clark, Religious Accommodation and Criminal Liability, 17 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 559, 580 (1990) (stating that “the danger of violating the establishment clause
‘cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no matter how vital it may be to the protection
of values promoted by the right of free exercise.’”) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 221 (1972)); KURLAND, supra note 1, at 22 (“To permit individuals to be excused from
compliance with the law solely on the basis of religious beliefs is to subject others to
punishment for failure to subscribe to those same beliefs.”). Although the government has
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handling “sins” within their communities, such as child sexual abuse.26
Part II.A thus explores some internal handling procedures used by only a
tiny fraction of the different denominations in the United States and how
the government responds to them.27
1.

The Roman Catholic Church

As one of the oldest religions in the world, the Catholic Church is
“not only a religious entity but a secular political force as well.”28
Because the Church enjoys such a deep and varied history, it has,
throughout time, developed its own legal system known as The Code of
Canon Law (“the Code”).29 The Code is the basic source of law in the
Church.30 The Code specifically forbids child sexual abuse and outlines

a compelling interest in protecting children, this interest must sometimes yield to a higher
parental right in rearing children. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232 (noting the “primary role
of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition.”); Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
165-66 (1944) (acknowledging a state’s interest in protecting a child’s welfare but stating
that the custody and nurture of the child resides first with the parent); Pierce v. Soc’y of the
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923) (finding that while a state has great latitude
in what it can do to improve quality of life for its citizens, parents have a natural duty and
fundamental right to care for and educate their children that must be respected). See also
Clark, supra, at 580 (discussing a state’s compelling interest in preventing child abuse.)
26
These institutionally practiced methods often conflict with the social policy of
protecting children by cloaking community members from government investigations.
Jones, supra note 6, at 351 (discussing the decades-long culture of secrecy as pertaining to
sexually abusive church officials).
We as a people, as a nation, and particularly as a collection of religious
institutions, have maintained, like the proverbial three monkeys, a selfprotective posture of ‘see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil.’
Child sexual abuse is routinely explained away, trivialized, or simply
denied whenever there is a risk of confrontation.
91 AM. JUR. TRIALS, supra note 24, at § 4 (emphasis added).
27
See infra Parts II.A.1-II.A.4 (discussing the Catholic Church, The Church of the Latter
Day Saints, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Amish).
28
Thomas P. Doyle, Canon Law and the Clergy Sex Abuse Crisis: The Failure From Above, in
SIN AGAINST THE INNOCENTS: SEXUAL ABUSE BY PRIESTS AND THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH 25 (2004). Doyle recounts that the Church throughout its history has served a
combination of functions from spiritual leader, to military power, to potent political power,
to an economic force. Id. at 26.
29
Id. at 25. “Canon,” derived from Greek, means “rule” or “straight line.” Id. This
system of self-governance is the oldest continuously functioning legal system in the world
today. Id.
30
Id.
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clear, detailed procedures for investigating such allegations.31 While the
Catholic Church has a historically rooted legal system in place to address
the problem of sexually errant clerics, the canonical system has been
ineffective at rectifying clergy sexual abuse.32 This failure, however, is
not associated with the Code itself, but rather with those in charge of its
implementation.33 The Vatican rarely removes errant priests from active
ministry, thus perpetuating recidivism.34 Rather than laicize clerics,
bishops have sent offending clergy to treatment centers and hospitals

31
See id. at 26. The Code states, “[i]f a cleric has otherwise committed an offense against
the sixth commandment of the Decalogue [a sexual offense] with force or threats or
publicly or with a minor below the age of sixteen, the cleric is to be punished with just
penalties, including dismissal from the clerical state if the case warrants it.” Id. (quoting
Canon Law Society of America, THE CODE OF CANON LAW c.1395 (1983)). Under canon
law, the most severe penalty for sexual misconduct is the removal of the individual from
the priesthood. Jones, supra note 6, at 359. Additionally, the Code contains provisions for
establishing a tribunal system which serves as both an internal civil and criminal court for
the purpose of determining the validity and egregiousness of sex abuse allegations and the
proper penalty for them. Doyle, supra note 28, at 26. Dismissal of clergy members can be
imposed through one of these canonical trials; however, due to the complexities, this is
rarely done. Id. at 27. Instead, the Pope can, upon request of the cleric, laicize the cleric. Id.
The Code does grant the Pope the power to dismiss a cleric against his will (usually upon
the request of his supervising bishop), but this, too, is an anomaly. Id. To laicize an errant
clergyman means that the Church effectively removes all clerical duties and returns the
individual to layperson status. Random House Inc., laicize, http://dictionary.reference.
com (last visited Aug. 22, 2007).
32
Doyle, supra note 28, at 28 (stating that the “canonical system has been an abysmal
failure at dealing with clergy sexual abuse”). Church leaders made decisions and took
actions that “placed the interests of the Catholic Church above those of [sexual abuse]
survivors and children.” Jones, supra note 6, at 358.
33
Doyle, supra note 28, at 28. The Code “becomes trivialized when bishops ignore it or
apply it dishonestly for self-serving purposes.” Id. Bishops and other Church leaders
were aware of the allegations and instances of sexual abuse, but still “failed to take
effective action to stop the abusers and to deal compassionately with victims.” Jones, supra
note 6, at 352. Instead, Church officials doubted the veracity of abuse allegations and told
victims that they had either “misunderstood or misinterpreted a priest’s affection as abuse
and were wrong for making the report.” Id. at 358.
34
Jones, supra note 6, at 352. The Church failed to “remove abusive priests from the
ministry and away from children.” Id. at 359.
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before returning them to their parishes.35 Additionally, bishops, acting
under instruction, have relocated clergy to distant dioceses.36
The result of these common practices is the perpetuation of crimes
against minors, as discovered in recent years with the highly publicized
sexual abuse scandals and the criminal justice system’s response to
them.37 Most criminal cases that have come before the courts have been
dismissed due to statute of limitation problems, and rarely do such cases
involve high-level church officials.38 Late in 2004, for example, Bishop
Thomas L. Dupre became the first Catholic bishop to be indicted for
sexually abusing a minor; however, hours after the indictment was filed,
the District Attorney withdrew it, allegedly due to the statute of
limitations.39 Instead, most abuse victims have sought “justice” against

Leslie M. Lothstein, The Relationship Between The Treatment Facilities and the Church
Hierarchy: Forensic Issues and Future Considerations, in SIN AGAINST THE INNOCENTS: SEXUAL
ABUSE BY PRIESTS AND THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 123 (2004). The Church hoped
that by sending errant clergy to a variety of different clinics, residential centers, nontherapeutic monastic enclosures, and hospitals, the sexually deviant behaviors could be
evaluated and treated without having to dismiss the clergy member. Id. After the
treatment was concluded, the errant clergyman would be returned to his ministerial duties
and allowed further access to children. Jones, supra note 6, at 359.
36
Lothstein, supra note 35, at 123 (suggesting that the relocation of errant clergy occurs
when scandals within a dioceses are looming, thus allowing the clergy to avoid detection
among parishioners or identification by their victims). A 1962 Church document, titled
“On the Manner of Proceeding in Cases of Solicitation[,]” specifically instructed church
officials to transfer sexually abusive priests. 91 AM. JUR. TRIALS, supra note 24, at § 3. The
document also mandated the destruction of all church documents pertaining to sexual
abuse allegations lacking foundation and to secret away all evidence pertaining to specific
abuse allegations. Id. In 2002, the Boston Globe uncovered thousands of pages of the
“Church’s own records to reveal institutional forgiveness of abusive priests, consistent
indifference to victims, and compelling evidence of a decades-long cover-up by a
succession of cardinals and their bishops.” Michael Rezendes, Scandal: The Boston Globe and
Sexual Abuse in the Catholic Church, in SIN AGAINST THE INNOCENTS: SEXUAL ABUSE BY
PRIESTS AND THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 28, at 1.
37
See Fain, supra note 9, at 225 (stating, “many courts have been reluctant to impose
liability on the defendants in these types of cases”).
38
Marci Hamilton, D.A.’s Clever Tactic in Child Sex Abuse Wars; Bringing, then Dismissing
Indictment against Bishop, Oct. 9, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/10/07/hamilton.
sex.abuse/index.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). See also, Laura Russell, Note, Pursuing
Criminal Liability for the Church and its Decision Makers for their Role in Priest Sexual Abuse, 81
WASH. U. L. Q. 885, 893 (2003) (“To date, no bishop, cardinal, or archdiocese has faced
criminal charges in connection with the child sex abuse scandal.”).
39
Hamilton, supra note 38. According to Hamilton, the prosecutor likely indicted
Dupre, knowing that the indictment would be withdrawn due to a statute of limitations
issue, for the purpose of expressing that Dupre committed the heinous crime. Id. The facts
of the indictment alleged that Dupre showed two young boys pornography, proceeded to
intoxicate them, and then sexually penetrated them over a five-year period with a two-year
overlap. Id. Aware that indictment would be withdrawn, Hamilton suspects that the
35
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their perpetrators by means of the civil system, but here, too, many have
found “justice” elusive.40
2.

The Church of Latter-Day Saints

The Catholic Church is not alone in establishing and upholding
internal policies that preserve its own traditions, interests, and
reputation.41 The Church of Latter-Day Saints, a division of the Mormon
faith, is divided into several different sects, the two primary ones being
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“LDS”) and The
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“FLDS”).42
There is a problem of child sexual abuse within each church, but the
problem is more prevalent in the FLDS due to its continued practice of
polygamy.43 The FLDS currently practices the “law of placing[,]” which

prosecutor persisted in filing it as a warning to other abusers that “the fact that they belong
to a religious institution will not insulate them from the criminal law.” Id.
40
See, e.g., J.M.V.v. Minnesota Dist. Council of Assemblies of God, 658 N.W.2d 589
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming dismissal of sexual misconduct lawsuit based on doctrine
of respondeat superior by deeming plaintiff waived review of the issue on appeal); Doe v.
South Central Spanish Dist. of the Church of God, 2002 WL 31296620 (Tex. App. Oct. 14,
2002) (upholding summary judgment for both church and pastor against claims of sexual
assault by husband and wife); Robertson v. Church of God, Int’l, 978 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. App.
1997) (granting summary judgment for the church because the alleged sexual conduct was
not performed in any official capacity); Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (granting demurrer to all seven charges brought against the
church due to either statute of limitations conflicts or failure to state a cause of action).
41
See infra Parts II.A.2-II.A.4 (presenting examples of internal policies from three other
religious denominations).
42
See, e.g., RAY B. WEST, JR., KINGDOM OF THE SAINTS 342 (1957); B.A. Robinson,
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (FLDS), Ontario Consultants on
Religious Tolerance, July 25, 2004, http://www.religioustolerance.org/flds.htm (last
visited Sept. 3, 2007) [hereinafter FLDS].
43
FLDS, supra note 42; USA: Polygamy related abuses in Utah, Women Living Under
Muslim Laws, Feb. 15, 2002, http://wluml.org/english/actionsfulltxt.shtml?cmd[156]=i156-3124 (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) [hereinafter USA: Polygamy]. In 1890, the LDS, in a
manifesto known as the “Great Accommodation,” suspended indefinitely the practice of
multiple marriages. FLDS, supra note 42. In 1935, the FLDS was founded by a number of
excommunicated LDS members who resumed the traditional Mormon practice of
polygamy. Id. “Indeed, many fundamentalist Mormons preferred excommunication to
renouncing polygamy, which they considered central to the church’s teachings.” CLAUDIA
LAUPER BUSHMAN & RICHARD LYMAN BUSHMAN, MORMONS IN AMERICA 102 (1999). The
FLDS continued to foster the belief that polygamy was necessary for salvation. Id. at 92.
The Church teaches that women are required to be subordinate to their husbands and
husbands should have at least three wives in order to obtain the highest eternal salvation.
Laura Blue, The Merry Wives: A Longtime Haven of Polygamy is Feeling the Heat from Police and
from Within, TIME, Oct. 10, 2005, at 22; John Dougherty, Derail Polygamy’s Money Train,
PHOENIX NEW TIMES, April 7, 2005, available at http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/200504-07/news/derail-polygamy-s-money-train/1.
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mandates that the prophet of the congregation assign all marriages
within the community.44 The combination of polygamy and the law of
placing often results in a shortage of available women within the church
community.45 The Church counters this by urging older men to take
child brides and by excommunicating young boys and men to reduce the
competition for wives.46 The FLDS sanctions incest and child abuse and
defends the practice as part of its constitutional right under the Religion
Clauses.47 Additionally, the LDS, while no longer condoning polygamy,
adheres to a strict practice of “repentance” and “forgiveness” resulting in
Church leaders returning known sex offenders to the ministry once they
have formally repented their transgressions.48
Consequently, the government is increasingly scrutinizing the FLDS,
but stern criminal penalties for the abuse that results from FLDS policies
are lacking, as illustrated by the Supreme Court of Utah’s decision in
State v. Holm.49 In Holm, the court upheld the criminal conviction of
44
Dougherty, supra note 43; Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,
Wikipedia,
http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundamentalist_Church_of_Jesus_of_
Latter_Day_Saints (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Fundamentalist Church]. Under the
law of placing, “[t]he prophet elects to take and give wives to and from men according to
their worthiness.” Fundamentalist Church, supra. Both the LDS and the FLDS consider
themselves Christians, “believing in continued revelation[s] from God[;]” consequently,
they believe that the president of the church, also known as the prophet, seer, and
revelator, presently “communicates with the deity.” Bushman, supra note 43, at 119.
45
FLDS, supra note 42. The prophet, however, not only assigns available women to men,
but is also permitted to reassign any man’s current wife and children to another man.
Dougherty, supra note 43. In such situations, the new husband often marries both the
mother and her daughter(s) (if any). Id.
46
FLDS, supra note 42. There are “[r]eported cases . . . in which girls from the ages of 13
to 16 have been married to older men” indicating a pattern of child marriage, sexual abuse,
and trafficking (as many girls are being transported to and from Canada for the purpose of
marriage). USA: Polygamy, supra note 43.
Adult women have also described battering, intimidation and sexual
abuse within polygamous families. Young women inside these
communities are vulnerable to coercion by family members and
religious leaders to enter polygamous marriages. Trained to obey
religious teachings and denied any other education, they may see no
real alternative.
Id. In addition, the FDLS has excommunicated over 400 teenage boys, as young as 13, for
the purpose of reducing the competition with older men for young brides. Fundamentalist
Church, supra note 44; see also Blue, supra note 43, at 22.
47
USA: Polygamy, supra note 43. FDLS leaders contend that government action against
polygamy-related abuses is equivalent to religious prosecution in violation of the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. Id.
48
91 AM. JUR. TRIALS, supra note 24, at § 3.
49
State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006). “Until recently, law enforcement largely
ignored polygamous groups like the FLDS.” Andrew Murr, Polygamist on the Lam: A Sect
Leader Lands on the FBI’s Most Wanted List, NEWSWEEK, May 22, 2006, at 37. Although
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Rodney Holm, a devout member of the FLDS, for bigamy and sexual
conduct with a minor.50 The trial court sentenced Holm to up to five
years in state prison for each conviction and imposed a $3,000 fine;
however, the court suspended both in lieu of three years of probation,
one year in a county jail with work release, and two hundred hours of
community service.51
Additionally, FLDS leader Warren Jeffs was recently convicted in
Utah on two counts of first-degree felony rape, and criminal charges in
Arizona are pending against him for performing marriages with child
brides.52 Jeffs’ arrest marks one of the first times in history that a church
leader has been criminally charged for a sex crime. Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that his arrest will suppress the prevalence of sexual abuse and
polygamy within the FLDS church.53

illegal, between 20,000 and 50,000 people live in polygamous families, consecrated as
“celestial marriages.” Andrew Murr, Strange Days in Utah, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 2000, at 74.
“[A]uthorities have long followed an informal policy . . . [of] ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’” in
regard to these unlawful marriages. Id.
50
Holm, 137 P.3d at 730. Holm was charged with three counts of unlawful sexual
conduct with a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old and one count of bigamy. Id. at 731. The
jury returned a guilty verdict on all four charges. Id.
51
Id. at 732. The original sentence was suspended, despite Holm taking 16 year-old
Ruth Stubbs, sister to his first wife, as his third wife at the age of 32. Id. at 730. Ruth
testified at trial that Holm regularly engaged in sexual intercourse with her, and by the
time she reached the age of majority, she had conceived two children with Holm. Id.
52
Associated Press, Jeffs May Retain His Grip Even From Jail, KUTV.com, Aug. 29, 2006,
available at http://kutv.com/local/local_story_241230306.html [hereinafter Jeffs]. Prior to his arrest,
Jeffs had been a fugitive for more than two years due to his placement on the FBI’s Most
Wanted List. Id. The felony sex crimes were based in part on Jeffs’ orchestrating the
marriages between underage girls and older men. Id. Jeffs was arrested after a routine
traffic stop because an officer could not identify his temporary tags. Brooke Adams & Lisa
Rosetta, FDLS Leader Jeffs Captured; Future of Leadership Cloudy, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE,
Aug. 30, 2006. In September 2007, Jeffs’ was convicted of two counts of first-degree felony
rape as an accomplice for his role in forcing an unwilling 14-year-old girl to marry her 19year-old cousin. Nancy Perkins, Resignation: Jeffs has dropped FLDS position, DESERT
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 6, 2007. Jeffs has also been indicted by a federal grand jury in Salt
Lake City, Utah on a charge of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution as a result of his time
on the FBI’s most wanted list. Id.
53
See Jeffs, supra note 52; Adams & Rosetta, supra note 52. On November 20, 2007, after
being sentenced to two terms of five-years-to-life, Jeffs formally resigned as president of
the FLDS church. Perkins, supra note 52. While some members of the FLDS church have
begun to waiver in their convictions, many more members of the FLDS church are offering
their complete support to Jeffs and vocalizing their disapproval of local law enforcement
officers for imprisoning such a holy man. Ben Winslow, FLDS sect may splinter now that Jeffs
is in prison, DESERT MORNING NEWS, Dec. 2, 2007. As a prophet of the FLDS church, Jeffs’
followers are not likely to abandon him or the faith because of the arrest unless they feel he
has violated his own FDLS faith. Adams & Rosetta, supra note 52.
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Jehovah’s Witnesses

The Jehovah’s Witnesses church, also known as the Watchtower
Society (“WTS”), is no stranger to sexual abuse of children either.54 In
recent years, abuse scandals and alleged cover-ups have been uncovered
within the WTS.55 Similar to the Catholic Church, the WTS takes a stance
that condemns such acts while simultaneously adhering to a “child
protection policy” that seemingly protects pedophiles.56
When
investigating an allegation of abuse on the part of a WTS member, the
Church follows a biblical standard requiring either “confession on the
part of the alleged perpetrator, or [t]he testimony of at least two
witnesses to a single case of abuse, or [t]he testimony of one witness to
abuse, followed by testimony of a second witness to another instance of
abuse.”57 As a result of this practice, the Church rarely prosecutes
reported cases of sexual abuse.58

54
See, e.g., B.A. Robinson, Jehovah’s Witnesses (WTS) Handling of Child Sexual Abuse Cases,
Ontario Consultants on Religious Toleration, Sept. 3, 2002, available at
http://www.religioustolerance.org/witness7.htm [hereinafter WTS Handling]; Jehovah’s
Witnesses and Child Protection, Jehovah’s Witnesses Office of Public Information,
http://www.jw-media.org/region/global/english/backgrounders/e_molestation.htm
(last visited Aug. 22, 2007) [hereinafter Office of Public Information]. The WTS was
founded in 1931 by Charles Taze Russell, who denied the deity of Jesus Christ. HERBERT
KERN, HOW TO RESPOND TO THE JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES 7 (1977). Instead, Jehovah’s
Witnesses hold that Jesus was first an angel, then for thirty-three years he roamed earth as
a man and, upon death, once more resumed his position as an angel. Id. at 22. The WTS
relies on the Bible and its own study thereof as set fort in its Watchtower Publications as its
only sources of inspiration. Id. at 8. WTS leaders believe that they are “God’s channel of
communication” and that salvation resides only within the Society. Id.
55
WTS Policies, supra note 24.
56
Office of Public Information, supra note 54; Jehovah’s Witnesses: Child Abuse Policy,
Panorama Forum, July 12, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/
live_forums/2124808.stm (last visited Aug. 22, 2007). The WTS has stated on its official
website, “[c]hild abuse is abhorrent to us. . . . Even one abused child is one too many.”
Office of Public Information, supra note 54. See also infra note 57 and accompanying text
(illustrating how pedophiles are protected).
57
WTS Handling, supra note 54. According to WTS officials, the two witness requirement
to substantiate an accusation of child abuse is based on Scripture. Office of Public
Information, supra note 54. Specifically, the requirement follows the teachings in the Bible
that say, “[n]o single witness should rise up against a man respecting any error or any
sin . . . At the mouth of the two witnesses or at the mouth of three witnesses the matter
should stand good.” Deuteronomy 19:15.
58
WTS Handling, supra note 54. Because few sexual assaults are witnessed, little proof
beyond the witness’s own accusations can be obtained. Id. In this common scenario, WTS
elders explain to the victim that the Church must view the accused as an innocent person
and leave the question of his guilt in God’s hands. Id. Regardless, in states that require
mandatory reporting of child abuse crimes and include religious clergy within the scope of
the statute, elders are expected to report even uncorroborated allegations. Id. However, if
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In the rare instance that an allegation is corroborated by multiple
witnesses or the accused admits guilt, then the member is
disfellowshipped.59 However, if the perpetrator can convince WTS
elders that he is truly repentant, then he may be permitted to stay within
the church, but will be relieved of all former responsibilities and will be
ineligible to resume holding a responsible job within the congregation
for at least twenty years.60 Even so, WTS officials admit that there are
exceptions to the general “punishment” for known but repentant sex
offenders, based on the individual’s record of service to the Church.61
For example, in October of 2000, Ronald Broadard, a Bible study teacher
and son of a Jehovah’s Witness church elder, was arrested for sexually
abusing a then ten-year-old girl over the course of two years during
Bible study.62 One year later, the charges were dismissed because
Broadard was found incompetent to stand trial; however, church elders,
including Broadard’s father, decided merely to “reprove” him, thus
allowing him to keep his title and responsibilities within the church.63
Comparable exceptions and policies of forgiveness also exist within
smaller, socially isolated religious communities, such as the Amish.64

a state does not have a mandatory reporting statute, the WTS church’s policy is to keep the
matter secret and instead try to handle the problem within the organization. Id.
59
See ANDREW HOLDEN, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: PORTRAIT OF A CONTEMPORARY
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT 32 (2002). Disfellowship is the equivalent of being excommunicated
in the Catholic Church. WTS Policies, supra note 24. The Governing Body of the Society
deals with minor offenses through a series of meetings known as “[c]ounselling.” HOLDEN,
supra, at 77. Disfellowship, therefore, is the ultimate sanction against a Witness. Id. at 79.
Because “absolution from sin is not in any way regarded as a sacrament or even a form of
spiritual healing[] [but] [r]ather . . . something that must be earned as part of the formal
procedure for reinstatement,” the process of shunning and disfellowship are necessary for
protecting both the sanctity of the community as well as the salvation of the sinner. Id. at
80.
60
See, e.g., WTS Handling, supra note 54; Office of Public Information, supra note 54.
61
Office of Public Information, supra note 54. “Anyone in a responsible position who is
guilty of child abuse would be removed from his responsibilities without hesitation.” Id.
However, “[i]n a few instances, individuals guilty of an act of child abuse have been
appointed to positions within the congregation if their conduct has been otherwise
exemplary for decades.” Id.
62
Kathleen Burge, Suit Charges Church Coverup: Jehovah’s Witness Group is Blamed in
Abuse of Girl, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 1, 2003, at B1.
63
Id. In January 2003, a civil lawsuit was filed against the Jehovah’s Witnesses by the
then-14-year-old victim and her parents alleging that the church covered up her sexual
abuse by a Bible study teacher and discouraged them from notifying police officials. Id.
The girl’s mother stated that the church elders appeared to “coddle” the abuser, while they
“socially ostracized” her for notifying law enforcement and pressing criminal charges. Id.
64
See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing some of the internal policies within the Amish
community).
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The Amish

Child sexual abuse affects all denominations, from mainline religions
to minority religious sects such as the Old Order Amish.65 The Amish
descended from sixteenth century Anabaptists and adhere to a fairly
strict policy of rejecting the modern society around them.66 The Amish
abide by the Ordnung, both for their district and their church.67 The
Ordnung governs all aspects of a community member’s life—from dress
codes, to prohibitions on modern conveniences such as television, cars,
and radios, to when and how a member can be admitted into the
church.68 The Ordnung also addresses what to do when major
transgressions, such as fornication and child abuse, are discovered.69

DONALD B. KRAYBILL & CARL F. BOWMAN, ON THE BACKROAD TO HEAVEN 12 (2001).
The Amish “have high religious ideals, but they are not perfect. Greed, gossip, envy,
deceit, and revenge sometimes lift their ugly faces. And there are occasional cases of
alcohol abuse, sexual abuse, and domestic violence as well. Despite their outward cloak of
righteousness, these people are people.” Id. Like other people, the Amish, too, “forget,
rebel, experiment, and for a variety of reasons, stray into deviance.” DONALD B. KRAYBILL,
THE RIDDLE OF AMISH CULTURE 111 (1989).
66
KRAYBILL & BOWMAN, supra note 65, at 1, 4-7. The Amish are the most conservative of
the Anabaptist churches, rejecting electricity, telephones, and industrialized farming
equipment. Id. at 6-7. Other Anabaptist churches include the Mennonite, the Hutterites,
and the Brethren. Id. at 1. Although the Amish appear “to be pressed from the same
cultural mold,” there are many differences in Amish practices among the many settlements
across the country. Id. at 107. These differences are camouflaged by at least ten badges of
identity shared by most Old Order Amish. Id. at 105-06. These badges are:
(1) horse-and-buggy transportation, (2) the use of horses and mules for
fieldwork, (3) plain dress in many variations, (4) a beard and shaven
upper lip for men, (5) a prayer cap for women, (6) the Pennsylvania
German dialect, (7) worship in homes, (8) eighth-grade private
schooling, (9) the rejection of electricity from public utility lines, and
(10) taboos on the ownership of televisions and computers.
Id.; see also JOHN A. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY 83-84 (4th ed. 1993).
67
HOSTETLER, supra note 66, at 82-83; KRAYBILL & BOWMAN, supra note 65, at 15. The
word Ordnung is German for “rules and discipline.” Id. These rules, while typically oral in
nature, are the “blueprint for an orderly way of life” and necessary for the welfare of the
church-community. HOSTETLER, supra note 66, at 82.
68
KRAYBILL & BOWMAN, supra note 65, at 106. “The Ordnung clarifies what is considered
worldly and sinful, for to be worldly is to be lost.” HOSTETLER, supra note 66, at 83. While
some of the provisions in the Ordnung are derived directly from the Bible, many are
supported by the sole reasoning that to do otherwise would be worldly and thus unholy.
Id. All members of an Amish community are aware of the Ordnung for their congregation,
irrespective of it primarily being oral and unwritten in form. Id. at 82.
69
See KRAYBILL & BOWMAN, supra note 65, at 109. Amish tradition has established the
ritual of confession as a means of punishing such deviant behavior as well as reuniting the
errant member with the community. KRAYBILL, supra note 65, at 111. There are four levels
to the ritual of confession based on the seriousness of the offense. Id. Level one, identified
as the “private” level, entails a church leader personally visiting with the offender. Id.
65
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Because the Amish church community favors living in isolation from
the outside world, members prefer to deal with such “sins” themselves
through a process of public confession, shunning, and, in worst case
scenarios, excommunication.70 If violators of the Ordnung publicly
confess their errant ways and demonstrate true repentance during their
shunning, the church will restore them in the community with full
forgiveness, while excommunicating those who do not.71 While this
practice of confession, shunning, and forgiveness may work as a sound
internal remedy for a dress code violation or a member caught watching
television, when it comes to adequately managing problems of sexual
abuse, the system allows ample opportunity for recidivism.72 By
allowing even the most serious perpetrators of sexual abuse to confess to
the Church and publicly apologize, the Amish community essentially
permits those individuals to continue to interact freely with the
community members, including its youth.73
The criminal justice system has been reluctant to impose itself on the
Amish community, despite the circulation of child abuse reports for
more than twenty years, because “the Amish do not want protection

Levels two and three both involve public confession, the former through “sitting” and the
later through “kneeling.” Id. at 111-12. Finally, level four entails a six-week ban, during
which time the individual is severed from all social contact, thus providing ample time for
reflection on the seriousness of the transgression before returning to the community and
publicly confessing via kneeling. Id. at 112-13.
70
KRAYBILL & BOWMAN, supra note 65, at 109. Violations of the Ordnung are confessed
publicly in a “members meeting.” Id. The purpose of the public confessions is to diminish
self-will, remind members of the “supreme value of submission[,]” and restore “the
wayward into the community of faith.” Id. Those transgressors who refuse to publicly
confess their sins, or those who confess extremely terrible sins such as child abuse, can
receive a six-week-long probation in which they are shunned by the rest of the community.
Id. The practice of shunning is often called Meidung. HOSTETLER, supra note 66, at 85;
KRAYBILL, supra note 65, at 115. Expelled or excommunicated people are ostracized and
shunned for life or until they repent, publicly confess their sins, and are reinstated into the
church. KRAYBILL, supra note 65, at 116. However, the Amish, like most denominations,
are “reluctant to dismiss deviant members[;]” thus, excommunication will only be imposed
after the offender is fully warned and encouraged to confess and the community
unanimously votes to do so. Id. at 114; Hostetler, supra note 66, at 85 (stating that the
Amish follow Matthew 18:15-17 when excommunicating a member).
71
KRAYBILL & BOWMAN, supra note 65, at 109-10. Even years after an offense,
excommunicated members can be fully restored into the church and forgiven if they return
to publicly confess their sins. Id. at 110; KRAYBILL, supra note 65, at 115.
72
See generally Nadya Labi, The Gentle People, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Jan. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2005/feature_labi_janfeb05.msp.
73
Id.; see also KRAYBILL, supra note 65, at 113 (“Those who confess their sin and promise
to ‘work with the church’ are reinstated into it.”).
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from the state - for religious reasons.”74 When the government does
intervene, secular justice is minimal.75
For example, in 2002, a
Philadelphia county judge wanted to incarcerate a convicted sex
offender for life for assaulting two Amish boys, but instead accepted a
plea agreement giving the recidivistic former Amish man eighteen to
thirty-six months in a state prison followed by five years of probation.76
In another instance, where an Amish girl contacted Children and Youth
Services (“CYS”) to report that she was being molested and raped by her
two older brothers and severely beaten and abused by her parents, the
family evaded justice.77 CYS interviewed the girl, but upon meeting
resistance from her parents and community members, the girl was
essentially left in the hands of her family.78 Prosecutors never charged
her parents or oldest brother with abuse, while a judge allowed the
74
Kathleen Brady Shea, Judge Accepts Plea to Protect Amish Boys, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Dec. 5, 2002, at B03. The Amish tend to make a prosecutor’s job more difficult by refusing
to report offenses and go to court, even when doing so is in their best interest. Id.; see also
Associated Press, Ex-Amish Women Tell of Repeated Sex Assaults: “I Wasn’t Going to be
Tortured Anymore,” One Says, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, July 19, 2004, at B1 [hereinafter
Women Tell].
75
Compare Associated Press, Judge Sentences Amish Man to Five Years in Sex Case,
CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 31, 2001, at 9A (discussing a five-year prison sentence given
to a 69-year-old Amish man for eleven counts of rape and gross sexual imposition when he
sexually assaulted two female minors), with Duane Schuman, Man to Get Sentence in SexAct Plea, Amish Children Targeted, Prosecutors Say, FORT WAYNE NEWS SENTINEL, May 1,
2001, at 1A (discussing a possible sixty-eight-year prison sentence for a non-Amish man
who abducted and sexually assaulted both male and female Amish children in his van as
they traveled home from school).
76
Shea, supra note 74. The lighter sentence is attributed in part to the victims’ preference
not to testify at trial due the Amish avoidance of the legal system and the sensitivity of the
charges. Id. The former Amish man had two prior convictions for indecent assault and
corruption of minors—one in 1991 and another in 1993. Id. The victims in all instances
were Amish boys ranging between ten and thirteen years of age. Id. His attorney and
friend described him as a sixty-nine-year-old man who has “made a couple of mistakes” in
his life and needs help, not punishment. Id.
77
Labi, supra note 72. The abuse began at the age of eleven when her nineteen-year-old
brother sexually molested her. Id. When he left the household, her seventeen-year-old
brother started raping her. Id. After she turned thirteen, and fearing pregnancy, she began
to fight against the repeated attacks, causing her brother to place significant pressure on
her chest, constricting her ability to breathe during the assaults. Id. Her father not only
ignored this sibling abuse, but continually would beat her with a piece of wood out at the
family woodpile when she violated even the most minor of Amish offenses, such as
coloring pictures with markers. Id.
78
Labi, supra note 72. Because the girl had done the unspeakable by seeking help from
outsiders for a family problem, her mother took her to an Amish dentist and, after the girl
had received a Novocain shot in each gum, proceeded to have all of her teeth removed as
punishment for talking. Id. The girl bled for three days and was shunned by her family
throughout the ordeal. Id. CYS discovered the abuse in its continued investigation, but
neither the dentist nor the mother was criminally charged. Id.
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younger brother to remain under Amish supervision, provided he stay
away from the girl.79
As a pluralistic society, the task falls to the government to juggle the
competing interests of hundreds of varying religious denominations
with those of the nation as a whole in accordance with the goals of the
First Amendment.80 The religious institutions presented here are but a
sampling of the array of religious ethos found within the borders of the
United States.81 In keeping with the tradition of pluralism, the Supreme
Court has struggled with answering the difficult questions presented
under the Religion Clauses; however, in addressing the pandemic of
child sexual abuse within the religious community, courts should find
fewer First Amendment violations while permitting more government

See id. At age nineteen, having received no relief from either her church or the state,
she left both her family and the church. Women Tell, supra note 74.
80
See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“The First Amendment has a dual
aspect. It not only ‘forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship’ but also ‘safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of
religion.’”). In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart commented upon the duty of the
Court in the face of internal First Amendment tensions. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
417 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart said, “[w]ith all respect, I think it is the
Court’s duty to face up to the dilemma posed by the conflict between the Free Exercise
Clause of the Constitution and the Establishment Clause as interpreted by the Court.” Id.
at 416.
81
See, e.g., McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844
(2005); County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492
U.S. 573 (1989). Justice Souter, in his majority opinion in McCreary, noted:
It is true that the Framers lived at a time when our national religious
diversity was neither as robust nor as well recognized as it is now.
They may not have foreseen the variety of religions for which this
Nation would eventually provide a home. They surely could not have
predicted new religions, some of them born in this country. But they
did know that line-drawing between religions is an enterprise that,
once begun, has no logical stopping point. They worried that “the
same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all
other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of
Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects.” The Religion Clauses, as a
result, protect adherents of all religions, as well as those who believe in
no religion at all.
McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 844 (internal citations omitted). In addition, Justice Blackmun
commented that:
This Nation is heir to a history and tradition of religious diversity that
dates from the settlement of the North American Continent. Sectarian
differences among various Christian denominations were central to the
origins of our Republic. Since then, adherents of religions too
numerous to name have made the United States their home, as have
those whose beliefs expressly exclude religion.
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 589.
79
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interventions into religious practices for the purpose of uncovering,
investigating, and prosecuting abuse perpetrators.82 The fact that the
criminal justice system has seemingly turned a blind eye on the problem
that is plaguing the church community, through its slow or tempered
responses to known instances of sexual abuse, suggests that more
stringent government acts, such as the abrogation of the clergycommunicant privilege, need to be implemented.83 Inaction not only
perpetuates a growing dilemma, but it serves as a form of reverse
discrimination under the Religion Clauses by conferring added benefits
to those within a religious community.84 Such preferential treatment on
the basis of religion conflicts with the dictates of the Religion Clauses by
seemingly endorsing religion over non-religion.85
B. History of Religion Clause Jurisprudence
Historically, because of their entwinement, the First Amendment’s
Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause86 commonly clash.87
See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67 (stating, “[t]he right to practice religion freely does not
include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter
to ill health or death.”).
83
Fain, supra note 9, at 224-25. “More sexual misconduct cases involving various
denominations have been decided by the courts during the 1990s and 2000s, and it is
clear . . . that the judiciary is often reluctant to impose liability on the church regardless of
how bizarre the events engendering the claims.” Id. Often, “the church will approach the
law enforcement agency investigating the allegations and assure them that this sex crime is
an ‘isolated incident’ and that the public interest will be best served by removing the
offender from the parish and sending them to treatment.” 91 AM. JUR. TRIALS, supra note
24, at § 8. In addition, given the time that passes between the actual abuse and the victim’s
report and the age or frailty of the victim, churches and law enforcement officials give in to
the temptation of disbelieving the veracity of such malicious crimes. Jones, supra note 6, at
358. As a result, the victims of child sexual abuse have obtained limited assistance from the
criminal justice system. Fain, supra note 9, at 215. “Many feel that the judiciary is not
acting forcefully or expeditiously enough in resolving the issue of clergy misconduct.” Id.
There is, however, hope that “persistent media focus addressing the issue and exposing the
clergy perpetrators of sexual abuse should exert pressure on the courts, as well as the
churches, to do whatever is necessary to alter ministerial behavior.” Id. at 225.
84
See KURLAND, supra note 25.
85
See id., supra note 1, at 18 (“[T]he proper construction of the religion clauses of the first
amendment is that the freedom and separation clauses should be read as a single precept
that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these
clauses prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a
burden.”).
86
U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .”).
87
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1454 (2d ed. 2005) (citing Walz v. Tax
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970)). Chemerinsky poses this hypothetical as an
illustration of the inherent tension that exists between the Religion Clauses: if the
government provides ministers for those in military service through the use of taxpayer
82
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Turning to the Framers’ intent often yields little relief for the dilemma of
“proper” Religion Clause application.88 Even so, with religious diversity
continually increasing, the United States Supreme Court has not shied
away from interpreting and applying the Religion Clauses, albeit
inconsistently doing so.89 Consequently, it is helpful to review each
clause separately, beginning with the Free Exercise Clause.90
1.

The Free Exercise Clause

The Supreme Court first analyzed the Free Exercise Clause in
Reynolds v. United States, when it examined whether to criminalize
religiously sanctioned polygamy.91 While acknowledging that the
dollars, the government is arguably establishing religion; however, if the government
refuses to provide any religious ministers to the armed forces, then it is arguably denying
the troops free exercise of religion. Id. Resolving this tension proves difficult because clear
meaning and applicability of the Religion Clauses have continually eluded the courts since
their inception in 1791. Id. at 1455. Determining a neutral method of applying the Religion
Clauses is frustrated by the fact that both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause are “cast in absolute terms[,]” and if either is “expanded to a logical extreme[,]”
they would clash with each other. Id. at 1454 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664,
668-69 (1970)).
88
Id. at 1454-55. The Court’s struggle in determining how best to apply the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment is perpetuated by the Framer’s differing views. There are
at least three distinct schools of thought which influenced the drafters
of the Bill of Rights: first, the evangelical view (associated primarily
with Roger Williams) that “worldly corruptions . . . might consume the
churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness were not maintained”;
second, the Jeffersonian view that the church should be walled off
from the state in order to safeguard secular interests (public and
private) “against ecclesiastical depredations and incursions”; and,
third, the Madisonian view that religious and secular interests alike
would be advanced best by diffusing and decentralizing power so as
to assure competition among sects rather than dominance by any one.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158-59 (2d ed. 1988). The problem
with turning to the Framers for interpretation of the Religion Clauses “is compounded by
the enormous changes” the country has undergone since the adoption of the First
Amendment. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 1455.
89
See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L.
REV. 807, 825-26 (1999). “It is plain that there is wide variety in American religious taste.”
Ballard, 322 U.S. at 94 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 589.
90
See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause).
91
98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878). Reynolds, the plaintiff, was a member of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, commonly known as the Mormon Church. Id. He testified
that:
it was the duty of male members of said Church . . . to practice
polygamy . . . that this duty was enjoined by different books which the
members of said Church believed to be of divine origin, and among
others the Holy Bible, and also that the members of the Church
believed that the practice of polygamy was directly enjoined upon the
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government cannot prohibit the free exercise of religion, the Court held
that the government could make particular actions illegal.92 The Court
emphasized that to allow all religious practices to go unchecked would
be to allow individual autonomy to overthrow the laws of the land.93
The Reynolds holding essentially protects religious beliefs while
simultaneously placing compelling social concerns above particular
religious practices.94
Almost a century later, the Supreme Court, in Sherbert v. Verner,95
addressed the Free Exercise Clause again, applying the traditional strict
scrutiny test to all laws burdening religious freedom.96 The South
Carolina statute at issue did not withstand strict scrutiny because it
unconstitutionally denied unemployment benefits in violation of the
Religion Clauses.97 The Court held that the government could not
male members thereof by the Almighty God . . . that the failing or
refusing to practice polygamy by such male members of said Church,
when circumstances would admit, would be punished . . . [by]
damnation in the life to come.
Id. Reynolds went on to say that he had received permission from his church’s authorities
to enter into the polygamous relationship. Id.
92
Id. at 166. While laws “cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they
may with practices.” Id. The Court stated that “there never has been a time in any State of
the Union when polygamy has not been an offense against society . . . .” Id. at 165. The
First Amendment’s guarantee of free religion could not possibly be intended to “prohibit
legislation in respect to this most important feature of social life.” Id.
93
Id. at 166-67 (reasoning that unchecked religious practices would “make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect . . . permit every
citizen to become a law unto himself”).
94
See Marc James Ayers, Law and Religion Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith Survives: Supreme Court Finds Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Unconstitutional, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 193 (1997). “Reasoning that the Constitution
protects religious beliefs but not necessarily religious practices, the Court placed great
importance on the concerns of society as a whole over and against the religious activities of
the few.” Id.
95
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
96
See generally id. at 398. Strict scrutiny, one of three general standards used by the
courts to evaluate the constitutionality of particular government acts, requires proof of a
compelling government interest. See, e.g., id. at 406-07; Smith, 494 U.S. at 883. Additionally,
the standard requires that the government prove that the means used to achieve its
professed interest are narrowly tailored—specifically, that they are the least restrictive
alternative. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07; Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
97
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410. But see id. at 414-15 (Stewart, J., concurring) (suggesting that
if the case had been determined under the Establishment Clause, the denial of
unemployment benefits would have been constitutional). Appellant was a member of the
Seventh-Day Adventist Church which observes the Sabbath Day on Saturdays. Id. at 399.
When her employer changed the work week for all shifts to include Saturdays, appellant
refused to work the sixth day due to “conscientious scruples.” Id. As a result, she was
dismissed. Id. After several unsuccessful attempts at finding employment that did not
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substantially burden an individual’s religious practices without first
having a compelling interest specifically tailored not to penalize
particular religious beliefs.98
Neither Reynolds nor Sherbert have been formally overruled, yet the
Court steered away from both precedents when it established the current
standard for free exercise claims in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.99 The Smith Court reviewed
Oregon’s drug use laws under the Free Exercise Clause and determined

require Saturday labor, appellant applied for unemployment compensation, and was
denied. Id. at 401.
98
Id. at 402 (stating that the government cannot “compel affirmation of a repugnant
belief nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold
religious views abhorrent to the authorities”) (internal citations omitted). The Court
reaffirmed Reynolds by acknowledging that “one’s religious convictions [are] not totally
free from legislative restrictions.” Id. at 403. However, it limited government restrictions
on religious practices to those acts that “pose[] some substantial threat to public safety,
peace or order.” Id. This holding marked a shift in First Amendment jurisprudence from
Reynolds by providing more protection to the individual. Ayers, supra note 94, at 193.
“After Sherbert, the crucial determination would now be whether the action taken by the
government substantially burdened the exercise of one’s religious practices and whether
the governmental interest asserted was compelling enough to justify the burden.” Id.
99
494 U.S. 872 (1990). Congress attempted twice to negate the Smith test. CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 87, at 1477-78. Congress’ first attempt to override the Smith standard was by
enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) in 1993. Id. The RFRA
specifically sought to restore Sherbert’s strict scrutiny test. Eugene Gressman, The Necessary
and Proper Downfall of the RFRA, 2 Nexus J. Op. 73, 76 (1997). This Act, however, was
deemed unconstitutional by the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The
RFRA failed because “a logical consequence . . . would be that the states would have to
provide exemptions for every possible religious conflict” and “the litigation costs
associated with such a burden, combined with the diminished power of the state to govern
effectively and with uniformity” were too vast. Ayers, supra note 94, at 196. By
invalidating the RFRA, the Court reinforced the principle that only the judiciary retains the
power to interpret the Constitution. Gressman, supra, at 73-74 (noting that the “RFRA
represent[ed] an unprecedented effort by Congress to execute one of the core functions of
the Court, the delicate function of interpreting the Constitution and applying that
interpretation to specific cases and controversies”). Congress’s second attempt came under
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2002 (“RLUIPA”).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 1478. There was much debate over the constitutionality of
RLUIPA, and at least three courts have held the Act as unconstitutional in violation of the
Establishment Clause. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003); Kilaab Al
Ghashiyah (Khan) v. Dep’t of Corrections of State of Wisconsin, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D.
Wis. 2003); Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566 (W.D. Va. 2003). But see Coronel v. Paul,
316 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Ariz. 2004) (upholding the validity of RLUIPA). However, in 2005,
the Supreme Court, revisiting one such Sixth Circuit test case involving inmates at the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction facility, finally determined that RLUIPA did
not constitute an Establishment Clause violation because “it alleviates exceptional
government-created burdens on private religious exercise.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709, 720 (2005).
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that the Sherbert test has never been used to invalidate a law.100 Instead
of applying Sherbert’s strict scrutiny test, the Court recognized a new
standard for Free Exercise Clause cases known as the “neutral, generally
applicable law” test.101 The Court noted that an individual’s beliefs have
never been an excuse for noncompliance with a valid law the State
possessed authority to create.102 Rather, only in situations that implicate
the First Amendment in conjunction with other constitutional
protections may the Court invalidate a neutral, generally applicable law
under the Free Exercise Clause.103
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85 (“Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life
beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require
exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law.”). The Court went on to suggest that
the Sherbert test be deemed inapplicable to such free exercise challenges. Id. The Court
implied that society would be “courting anarchy” by requiring a compelling government
interest before validating a law that encroaches upon some individual’s professed beliefs.
Id. at 888. “To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the
law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is
‘compelling’—permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, ‘to become a law unto himself,’—
contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.” Id. at 884-85 (quoting, in
part, Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167) (internal citations omitted). In this case, plaintiffs were
Native Americans and members of the Native American Church, which required the
ingestion of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug derived from a plant called Lophophora
williamsii Lemaire, during certain religious ceremonies. Id. at 874. Oregon law prohibited
the possession of a controlled substance except when the drug was prescribed for
medicinal use. Id. Under the law, peyote was a Schedule I narcotic and its possession was
considered a Class B felony. Id. Plaintiffs were employees of a private drug rehabilitation
facility but were terminated when their peyote use was discovered. Id. The lawsuit ensued
when plaintiffs were denied unemployment benefits due to their use of peyote for
ceremonial purposes. Id.
101
Id. at 881. The Court further stated that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).’” Id. at 879 (quoting, in part, United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
102
Id. The Court, reasoning that allowing exemptions to generally applicable laws for
every conceivable religious claim would make governing inefficacious, held that, despite
potentially rendering the practice of someone’s religion impossible, a neutral, generally
applicable law will not be subjected to strict scrutiny standards. See Ayers, supra note 94, at
194. “The Smith majority distinguished Sherbert by finding that the strict scrutiny balancing
test is appropriate when a state already has a system of individual exemptions in place, but
that general, facially neutral prohibitions will not require a compelling governmental
interest.” Id.
103
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. The Court, in dicta, proposed an “exception to its neutral law
of general applicability rule: the ‘hybrid rights’ exception. . . . Essentially, the exception
suggests that courts should apply heightened judicial scrutiny when a case involves a free
exercise component along with another fundamental right.” Christopher R. Pudelski, The
Constitutional Fate of Mandatory Reporting Statutes and the Clergy-Communicant Privilege in a
Post-Smith World, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 720-21 (2004). See also Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters
of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a law mandating
100
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The inconsistency among courts that attempt to identify a First
Amendment violation as pertaining to the Free Exercise Clause,
demonstrates the challenges courts face when assessing the
constitutionality of government actions.104 The process, moreover, is
further complicated by the Establishment Clause.105
2.

The Establishment Clause

Establishment Clause issues are often determined based on one of
three mainline approaches the Court utilizes in analyzing the relation
between the government and religion.106 As a result, there is vast
inconsistency in the manner in which the Court has interpreted different
government acts under the Establishment Clause.107 For example, in
attendance in public schools as violating both the Free Exercise Clause and parents’ right to
rear their children); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating compulsory
education laws as pertaining to the Amish due to the combination of the free exercise of
religion and the parental right to raise a child).
104
See McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 882
(2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Reasonable minds can disagree about how to apply the
Religion Clauses in a given case. But the goal of the Clauses is clear: to carry out the
Founders’ plan of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic
society.”).
105
See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the entwinement between the
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause and tension it causes).
106
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 1486; see Tribe, supra note 88. The three main
competing Establishment Clause theories are the strict separation theory, the neutrality
theory, and the accommodation theory. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 1486-89. Strict
separationists firmly believe that government and religion should, as their name suggests,
be separated as much and to the greatest extent possible in order to protect the religious
liberty under the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 1486. Neutrality supporters take the stance
that government “cannot favor religion over secularism or one religion over others.” Id. at
1487. Finally, accomodationists suggest that the Establishment Clause should be
interpreted as recognizing religion’s importance and the need of accommodating its
presence in government. Id. at 1489. The Court is frequently composed of adherents of all
three theories, thus making it near impossible to predict the outcome of a particular case.
Id. at 1486.
107
Hamilton, supra note 89, at 824-25 (“The Supreme Court’s doctrine in the
Establishment Clause arena has been treated to more internal and external criticism for its
lack of consistency, perhaps, than any other constitutional doctrine.”). See also John H.
Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution,
72 CAL. L. REV. 847, 847 (1984) (calling for a “more encompassing and clearer view of both
of the religion clauses of the first amendment and also of the relation between the religion
clauses and other provisions of the Constitution”); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (stating “[O]ur Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray . . . .”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984)
(suggesting that in all Establishment Clause cases, the Court must “reconcile the
inescapable tension between the objective of preventing unnecessary intrusion of either the
church or the state upon the other, and the realty that . . . total separation of the two is not
possible”).
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court established a test to evaluate laws and
actions under the Religion Clauses that has been haphazardly
followed.108
The Court in Lemon admitted that identifying a violation of the
Establishment Clause is difficult because, in most cases, a particular law
does not propose to establish a state religion directly, but rather has the
potential to serve as the impetus for doing so in the future.109 To placate
these fears, the Court instituted a three-pronged test for determining the
constitutional validity of laws under the Establishment Clause.110 While
acknowledging that some relationship between government and religion
is unavoidable, the Court stated that political division along religious
lines had to be avoided, and the test was meant to help attain that goal.111

403 U.S. 602 (1971). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 1499. The future of the
Lemon test is unknown. Id. There is much criticism surrounding the Lemon test, claiming it
“has proven unwieldy and has led to inconsistent results.” Long, supra note 23, at 774. As
such, inferences may be drawn from recent Court decisions that the Court is slowly moving
towards an abandonment of the Lemon test. Id.; see also McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 900
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (stating, “[a]s bad as the Lemon test is, it is worse for the fact that, since
its inception, its seemingly simple mandates have been manipulated to fit whatever result
the Court aimed to achieve.”).
109
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. “A given law might not establish a state religion but
nevertheless be one ‘respecting’ that end in the sense of being a step that could lead to such
establishment and hence offend the First Amendment.” Id. Two statutory provisions were
at issue in Lemon. Id. at 106. One was a Pennsylvania statute providing financial support to
private elementary and secondary schools via reimbursement for the costs of teacher
salaries, textbooks, and other materials used in secular subjects. Id. at 606-07. The other
was a Rhode Island statute that directly paid fifteen percent of private elementary school
teachers’ salaries. Id. at 607. The opinion held that both types of subsidies to parochial
schools were unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause. Id. at 625. The Court reasoned that the “Constitution decrees that religion must be
a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and
that while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn.” Id.
110
Id. at 612-13. The three prongs of the Lemon Test are: (1) that the statute “have a
secular legislative purpose[;]” (2) that its primary effect is neither to advance nor inhibit
religion; and (3) that it does “not foster an ‘excessive government entanglement with
religion.’” Id. (quoting, in part, Walz, 397 U.S. at 674). Excessive entanglement is
determined by examining the character and purposes of the benefiting institutions, the
nature of the state aid, and the relationship between the state and the religious institution
as a result. Id. at 615.
111
Id. at 622. “[P]olitical division along religious lines was one of the principal evils
against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.” Id. The Court identified
three additional evils the Establishment Clause alone was enacted to prevent and
constructed the Lemon test as a method of countering the realization of those evils. Id. at
612 (identifying the three evils to be “sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity”) (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668).
108
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After the creation of the Lemon test, the Court heard numerous cases
challenging the constitutionality of a wide range of issues under the
Establishment Clause.112 The outcomes of those cases, however, were
less uniform than expected due to the inconsistent application of the
Lemon test by the Court.113 For instance, Lynch v. Donnelly114 and County
of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter115
involved similar religious issues but resulted in different outcomes.116

112
For examples of conflicting application of the Lemon test, see generally Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327
(1987); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Serv. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Bd. of Tr. of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1984); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980);
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Levitt v. Comm.
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp.,
Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). For similar cases where the Lemon test was
not applied at all, see generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228 (1982); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
113
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005). The Van Orden court explained that:
just two years after Lemon was decided, we noted that the factors
identified in Lemon serve as ‘no more than helpful signposts.’ Many of
our recent cases simply have not applied the Lemon test. Others have
applied it only after concluding that the challenged practice was
invalid under a different Establishment Clause test.
Id. (quoting, in part, Hunt, 413 U.S. at 741) (internal citations omitted). See, e.g., Good News
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (holding that a public school could not
deny a Christian club use of the facility for a meeting place after school hours because a
modified heckler’s veto, “in which a group’s religious activity can be proscribed on the
basis of what the youngest members of the audience might misperceive,” is not employed
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (holding that because the Establishment
Clause “does not compel the exclusion of religious groups from government benefits
programs that are generally available to a broad class of participants,” a student-run
religious organization could not be denied university funding to print a newspaper);
Lamb’s Chapel v. Cent. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993) (holding
that allowing a religious institution to use public school property to show a film series
dealing with child-rearing and family issues would not violate the Establishment Clause
under the Lemon test); see also supra note 108 (addressing the unwieldy nature of the Lemon
test and the Court’s potential abandonment of it).
114
465 U.S. 668 (1984).
115
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
116
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668. The question posed in the Lynch case was whether a
municipality’s use of a crèche as an element in its public Christmas display was in violation
of the Establishment Clause. Id. Similarly, the issue arising in Allegheny concerned two
different holiday displays—the first utilizing a crèche and the second a menorah. See
generally Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573.
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In Lynch, the Court addressed the Lemon test but stated that “no
fixed, per se rule can be framed.”117 Instead, taking an accommodationist
approach, it reasoned that the Constitution mandated not merely
tolerance of but also non-hostile accommodation of all religions.118
Consequently, the Court held that the Establishment Clause did not
prohibit a municipality from including a crèche in its Christmas
display.119 Several years later, however, in contrast to the Lynch decision,
the Allegheny Court followed the endorsement analysis outlined in
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion to Lynch and concluded that the
city’s use of the crèche was a violation of the Establishment Clause,
though it upheld the legality of the menorah.120 Thus, the Allegheny
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678.
The line between permissible relationships and those barred by the
Clause can no more be straight and unwavering than due process can
be defined in a single stroke or phrase or test . . . .
In the line-drawing process we have often found it useful to
inquire whether the challenged law or conduct has a secular purpose,
whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion,
and whether it creates an excessive entanglement of government with
religion. But, we have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.
Id. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).
118
Id. at 673 (“Indeed, we have observed, such hostility would bring us into ‘war with
our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment’s guaranty of the free exercise
of religion.’”) (quoting People of State of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Ed. of Sch., 333
U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948)); see also supra note 106 (discussing the three primary competing
theories of Establishment Clause analysis).
119
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670-71. The city displayed the crèche, or Nativity scene, for more
than 40 years, and was situated in a park owned by a nonprofit organization. Id. As per
Christian tradition, the display consisted of figurines depicting the infant Jesus Christ,
Mary, Joseph, several angels, shepherds, three kings, and some animals. Id. The city
displayed the crèche in conjunction with other traditional holiday symbols such as: a Santa
Claus house, reindeer and a Santa sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers,
colored lights, cutout figures of clowns and elephants, and a large banner that read
“Seasons Greetings.” Id. The city had purchased all of the decorations at a taxpayer cost of
$1365. Id. Based on these facts, the Court concluded that inclusion of the crèche was not
expressly advocating a particular religious message and only served a secular purpose. Id.
at 680-81. But see id. at 690-91 (O’Connor, J. concurring) (“The purpose prong of the Lemon
test . . . . is not satisfied . . . by the mere existence of some secular purpose, however
dominated by religious purposes . . . . The proper inquiry . . . is whether the government
intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.”).
120
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579. The Nativity scene was organized by the Holy Name
Society, a Roman Catholic group. Id. It represented the manger in Bethlehem shortly after
the birth of Jesus as described in the Bible, and included all of the traditional characters. Id.
at 580. In addition, the wooden manger had as its crest, an angel carrying a banner that
proclaimed “Gloria in Excelsis Deo” meaning “Glory to God in the highest.” Id. at 580-81.
Unlike in Lynch, no Santa Claus, reindeer, or other figurines appeared near the Nativity. Id.
The Chanukah menorah was owned by Chabad, a Jewish group, but was maintained and
stored by the city. Id. at 587. In contrast to the Nativity, the menorah was displayed along
117
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holding effectively clarified that “government’s use of religious
symbolism” would be “unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing
religious beliefs.”121
As illustrated by the Lynch and Allegheny decisions, a consistent legal
analysis of Establishment Clause challenges is impossible, because such
challenges are wrought with important and sensitive complications.122
Nevertheless, the Court has interpreted history and politics enough to
give the Establishment Clause some shape, even if it “is precious
little . . . on which we can hang our hats.”123 The shape of the
side several large, fully decorated Christmas trees and a sign titled “Salute to Liberty[,]”
which bore the mayor’s name. Id. at 581-82. The liberty sign read, “During this holiday
season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are
the keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom.” Id. at 582. The Nativity
scene was placed on the Grand Staircase located inside the county’s courthouse while the
Chanukah menorah was displayed just outside the City-County building. Id. at 578.
Unable to find sufficient guidance under the Lynch opinion, the Court applied Justice
O’Conner’s endorsement test. Id. at 595; see supra note 119 (discussing the endorsement
test). The Court interpreted the Nativity scene to be an effective endorsement of “a
patently Christian message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ,” while dismissing
the menorah as a non-sanctified object and symbol of a cultural holiday ranking relatively
low in religious significance in the Jewish community. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 584, 586-87,
601. Chanukah was viewed as having a “socially heightened status” which reflected its
“cultural or secular dimension” as opposed to Christmas, which could be seen as the
holiest of Christian holidays. Id. at 587.
121
Id. at 597.
122
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is inconsistently applied to cases needing
adjudication); see also supra note 106 (addressing the difficulty in obtaining consistent court
holdings pertaining to the Religion Clauses). Some scholars, however, have suggested that
this lack of consistency in Establishment Clause cases is highly beneficial, because “church
and state ever will reach for an increase in power (either alone or together) . . . [and] [r]ote
application of bright-line rules to similar factual skeletons would hand church and state a
too easily manipulable regime.” Hamilton, supra note 89, at 825-26. Both church and state
can change the balance of power in an infinitely creative number of ways; therefore, having
predictable standards for Religion Clause analysis should never be the Court’s goal. Id. at
825. Demanding consistency and predictability in Religion Clause jurisprudence distracts
from the more pressing question of proper allocation of power between state and religion.
Id. at 826.
123
Id. at 822; see also Mansfield, supra note 107, at 904 (referring to the Court’s Religion
Clause decisions as a “nearly impenetrable cloud of words and ‘tests’”). The Court has
clarified the Establishment Clause to mean this much:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
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Establishment Clause is concrete enough to support the government’s
extension of existing investigatory tools, such as mandatory reporting
statutes, into the realm of religion in order to combat child sexual
abuse.124
C. Mandatory Reporting Statutes
Reporting statutes are one type of investigative tool implemented by
the states to aid in the difficult task of prosecuting sexual abuse.125
Because government intervention and prosecution of child sexual abuse
crimes is made possible only by first discovering the need to act,126 states
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 591 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Edu. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1947)). In addition, it has been noted that the Religion Clauses embody the formerly
radical idea that “[f]ree people are entitled to free and diverse thoughts, which government
ought neither to constrain nor to direct.” McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 881-82 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
124
See infra Part II.C (discussing mandatory reporting statutes use as an investigatory
tool); Part III.A (demonstrating the constitutional feasibility of including clergy members
within the scope of mandatory reporting statutes).
125
See Myers, Diedrich, Lee, Fincher & Stern, supra note 10, at 58 (discussing the difficulty
in proving child sexual abuse in court). Apart from the challenge of identifying instances
of sexual offenses, the nature of the crime itself is wrought with evidentiary obstacles.
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (“Child abuse is one of the most difficult
crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses except the
victim.”). In addition to lack of witnesses, in some instances the child victim is
incompetent to testify on his or her behalf. Myers, Diedrich, Lee, Fincher & Stern, supra
note 10, at 58. The child is often too young or too frightened to effectively testify. Id.
Moreover, “[t]he problems of ineffective child testimony and lack of eyewitnesses are
compounded by the paucity of medical evidence in most child sexual abuse cases.” Id.
Merely acknowledging these evidentiary obstacles is insufficient; thus, judges have begun
adjusting time-honored courtroom practices to better accommodate children. Id. at 57; see
also supra note 10 (providing examples of such accommodations made thus far by courts).
126
“[I]ntervention is not possible unless there is first detection.” Ashley Jackson, The
Collision of Mandatory Reporting Statutes and the Priest-Penitent Privilege, 74 UMKC L. REV.
1057, 1065 (2006). Mandatory reporting statutes increase the likelihood of obtaining helpful
information that will lead to criminal prosecution. Pudelski, supra note 103, at 736. A
Massachusetts Attorney General report in 2003 blamed the state’s inability to prosecute
more child abuse perpetrators on weak reporting statutes. Id. at 714; Office of the Attorney
General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, The Sexual Abuse of Children in the Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of Boston 73 (2003), http://www.ago.state.ma.us/archdiocese.pdf. (last
visited Aug. 10, 2007). Child abuse is not easily detectable by law enforcement on its own
due to the inexperience, fears, and vulnerability of the victims and their failure to report
the abuse. Jackson, supra, at 1065 (citing “the age and vulnerability of the young victims
who would refrain from reporting abuse” as a major source of detection difficulties).
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fashioned mandatory reporting statutes “for the purpose of detecting
and eradicating child abuse.”127
The call for reporting statutes began in the early 1960s and included
disclosure primarily by physicians and other medical practitioners.128 By
1967, all fifty states had adopted some form of a statute mandating
reports of known or suspected instances of abuse to law enforcement
officials.129 Over the years, the statutes expanded so as to include more
professionals likely to encounter child abuse.130

Andrew A. Beerworth, Treating Spiritual and Legal Counselors Differently: Mandatory
Reporting Laws and the Limitations of Current Free Exercise Doctrine, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 73, 103 (2004). The primary purpose behind the implementation of mandatory
reporting statutes initially was the protection of children. See Pudelski, supra note 103, at
706-07 (stating reporting requirements were a response to the public concern of child
abuse); Raymond C. O’Brien & Michael T. Flannery, The Pending Gauntlet to Free Exercise:
Mandating that Clergy Report Child Abuse, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1, 21-22 (1991). Based on the
language of the statutes, it is apparent that:
reporting requirements are intended to initiate preventative measures
by proper authorities to guard against future abuse. In addition to
providing safeguards for children, these reporting statutes are aimed
at protecting the integrity of the family unit. It follows, then, that
reporting provisions are designed to ensure that children can develop
normally through growth in a proper mental, physical and emotional
atmosphere.
O’Brien & Flannery, supra, at 22.
128
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare published the first model
reporting statute in 1963, requiring physicians to report any suspected cases of child abuse
under penalty of misdemeanor for failing to do so. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 126, at 1065;
Potter, supra note 4, at 270.
129
See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 126, at 1065-66; Pudelski, supra note 103, at 706; Lawrence
R. Faulkner, Mandating the Reporting of Suspected Cases of Elder Abuse: An Inappropriate,
Ineffective and Ageist Response to the Abuse of Older Adults, 16 FAM. L.Q. 69, 75 (1982-83) (all
providing accounts of the historical development of child abuse reporting statutes in the
United States). Today, all fifty states, together with the District of Columbia and the Virgin
Islands, have implemented some form of a statute requiring instances of child abuse to be
reported to various authorities. Danny R. Veilleux, Validity, Construction, and Application of
State Statute Requiring Doctor or Other Person to Report Child Abuse, 73 A.L.R.4th 782 (1989);
Beerworth, supra note 127, at 98. For most state reporting statutes, see the following: Ala.
Code § 26-14-3 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620
(West 2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-507 (West 2006); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165-11166
(West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-304 (West 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101(b)
(2006); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 16, § 903 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. § 415.504 (2006); Ga. Code. Ann.
§ 74-111 (West 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1.1 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1619 (2006);
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-11 (West 2006); IOWA CODE § 232.69 (2006); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 620.030 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B) (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 122, § 4011 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-704 (West 2006); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West 2006); MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 43-21-353 (West 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.115 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201
(West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-711 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.220 (2006); N.H. REV.
127
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Common mandatory reporting statutes contain two types of
provisions, “provisions that apply to certain individuals and permissive
reporting provisions that apply to everyone.”131 The statutes typically
provide immunity from suit for reporting as well as threaten both civil
and criminal liability for failing to do so.132 However, as a result of the
growing number of abuse scandals, a few states have added
amendments to strengthen their reporting statutes.133
In an attempt to improve the effectiveness of the reporting statutes,
some states have added clergy to the list of those professionals required
to disclose information covered under the statute.134 The inclusion of
STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 2006); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW
§ 413 (McKinney 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.42.1 (LexisNexis 2006); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6311 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-113 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-3 (2006);
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 37-1-403 (West 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (2006); VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.1-248.3 (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030 (2006); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2
(2006); WIS. STAT. § 48.981(2) (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (West 2006).
130
See Jackson, supra note 126, at 1066. Professionals typically included within the scope
of the reporting statute are: teachers, law enforcement officials, social workers, physicians,
therapists, and guidance counselors. Id. Reporting statutes have also been expanded to
provide further protections against neglect, sexual abuse, and physical, mental, and
emotional abuse. Pudelski, supra note 103, at 707.
131
Potter, supra note 4, at 270.
132
Potter, supra note 4, at 270. See also Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976). Flood
was a hallmark decision that provided the necessary force to give life to the reporting
statutes. Jackson, supra note 126, at 1066. The Flood court held that physicians could be
liable for negligence in civil cases for failing to report suspected instances of child abuse to
the proper law enforcement agencies. Flood, 551 P.2d at 392.
133
Pudelski, supra note 103, at 713-14, nn.78-81. These amendments include: (1)
extending or eliminating the statute of limitations for torts and sexual crimes; (2) increasing
the penalties, both civil and criminal, for child abuse; and (3) creating new crimes such as
the crime of “recklessly endangering children.” Id. at 713-14. Nevertheless, for the vast
majority of states, the substance of their mandatory reporting statutes has remained
unaltered. Id.; see also infra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of
mandatory reporting statutes to include clergy members).
134
Pudelski, supra note 103, at 713, n.79. Inclusion of clergy members under the scope of
mandatory reporting statutes has been met with much resistance. See generally Chad
Horner, Beyond the Confines of the Confessional: The Priest-Penitent Privilege in a Diverse
Society, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 697, 730 (1997); Beerworth, supra note 127, at 106-07; Jackson,
supra note 126, at 1062; Michael Keel, Law and Religion Collide Again: The Priest-Penitent
Privilege in Child Abuse Reporting Cases, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 681, 682-83 (1998). The main
contentions opponents have against mandating clergy to report abuse and abrogating the
clergy-communicant privilege are that to do so would constitute a Free Exercise Clause
violation, would deter parishioners from seeking spiritual guidance or confession, would
ultimately result in an increase in sexual abuse, would inhibit congregants from cleansing
their souls, would hinder their ability to obtain eternal salvation, would impede upon
individual privacy rights, and would result in a slippery slope of government intrusion.
Horner, supra; Beerworth, supra note 127, at 106-07; Jackson, supra note 126, at 1062; Keel,
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clergy members in the scope of reporting statutes calls into question the
applicability of the clergy-communicant privilege.135 As such, child
abuse reporting statutes fall within one of three general categories: (1)
those that specifically abrogate the clergy-communicant privilege in
cases pertaining to suspected child abuse; (2) those that include clergy in
a catch-all provision requiring “any person” to report; and (3) those that
preserve the clergy-communicant privilege by affirmatively exempting
members of the clergy from reporting.136
Given that one of the most challenging obstacles to prosecuting child
abuse is discovering its existence, and given that clergy members are in a
unique position to obtain such information, mandatory reporting
statutes that call for a suspension of the clergy-communicant privilege
increase the likelihood of controlling the pandemic of child abuse.137

supra; see also infra Part III.B (addressing and dispelling each of these arguments against
abrogating the clergy-communicant privilege in the context of mandatory reporting
statutes).
135
See O’Brien & Flannery, supra note 127, at 26-30. Forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia identify the clergy-communicant privilege within their evidence laws. Id. at 29.
The privilege protecting communications between a clergy member and a congregant has
been described as absolute. 81 AM. JUR. 2D WITNESSES § 493 (2006). “Notwithstanding the
distinction between a privilege from testifying about confidential communications and a
privilege from reporting them, twenty-five states have reporting statutes that include the
clergy.” O’Brien & Flannery, supra note 127, at 29. The form varies as to how clergy are
included in the statute, such as: specifically mandating clergy report; implying that they do
so; abrogating all privileges thus by default applying it to clergy; or simply abrogating the
clergy-communicant privilege. Id. at 29-30 n.148; see also infra Part II.D (discussing the
history of the clergy-communicant privilege).
136
See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 126, at 1066; Beerworth, supra note 127, at 99. States
maintaining the clergy-communicant privilege in full include: Alaska, Arkansas; Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Vermont. Beerworth,
supra note 127, at 99 n.171-72. States that simply include clergy members among the other
listed professionals with a duty to report are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, and Texas. Id. at 99 n.173. Finally, states that utilize a catchall phrase, such
as “any person[,]” to include clergy members are: Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 99 n.174.
137
Pudelski, supra note 103, at 736 (“[O]ne large obstacle to preventing abuse is the
limited ability of the state to discover abuse in the first place. Consequently, because clergy
members are in unique positions to receive such information, they appear to be one of the
state’s most important resources to combat abuse.”). State interests in prosecuting sexual
offenders are advanced through the use of mandatory reporting statutes. Id. Mandatory
reporting statutes:
compel citizens, under the threat of punishment, to notify the state of
any alleged abuse. They create a link between child welfare services
and families of victims so that the social programs in place can work
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D. The Clergy-Communicant Privilege
The clergy-communicant privilege did not exist at common law;
rather, it was an evidentiary invention of both state and federal
governments.138 The privilege was recognized initially, through dicta, by
the Supreme Court in 1875, but was not officially recommended to
Congress for codification until 1972.139 Congress rejected the Court’s
suggestion to implement a specific evidentiary provision pertaining to
the clergy-communicant privilege, but instead adopted a rule which
created a more general and flexible provision that could be applied to all
testimonial privileges.140
Nevertheless, every state and federal
jurisdiction recognizes the privilege.141

with families and authorities to prevent additional abuse. In this way,
“[m]andatory reporting laws play a central role in the child protection
system, serving as the point of intersection among outlets of children’s
services, including medical care, mental health, education, and social
services.”
Id. at 707 (quoting, in part, SETH KALICHMAN, MANDATORY REPORTING OF SUSPECTED CHILD
ABUSE 139 (American Psychological Association 2d ed. 1999)).
138
See Pudelski, supra note 103, at 708 (noting that the clergy-communicant privilege did
not exist at common law). The clergy-communicant privilege is a rule of evidence, codified
federally as Rule 501. Keel, supra note 134, at 683-84; see infra notes 139-40 and
accompanying text. Other commonly used terms in referencing the clergy-communicant
privilege are: “clergyman-penitent” privilege, “clergy-confider” privilege, “clericcongregant” privilege, “priest-penitent” privilege, and “ministerial” privilege. DAVID M.
GREENWALD, EDWARD F. MALONE & ROBERT R. STAUFFER, The Clergy Communications
Privilege, 1 Testimonial Privileges § 6:1, § 6:1 n.1 (2006).
139
See Pudelski, supra note 103, at 709-10. In 1875, the Court, via dicta, acknowledged the
existence of certain evidentiary privileges in Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)
(“[S]uits cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of the confidences of the
confessional, or those between husband and wife, or of communication by a client to his
counsel for professional advice, or of a patient to his physician for a similar purpose.”). In
1972, the Supreme Court proposed and approved a version of the Federal Rules of
Evidence containing a specific provision for the clergy-communicant privilege. Pudelski,
supra, at 710. This provision was known as proposed Rule 506. Id. Congress never enacted
proposed Rule 506 but rather adopted Rule 501, “which makes the common law the
starting point in determining whether the court should recognize the priest-penitent
privilege.” Jackson, supra note 126, at 1061.
140
Pudelski, supra note 103, at 710. Federal Evidentiary Rule 501 states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to
an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule
of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
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While official acknowledgment of the clergy-communicant privilege
is relatively new, the privilege can trace its origins to biblical times and
the creation of the Catholic Seal of Confession.142 The Seal, as
incorporated in the Code of Canon Law, makes it a crime for a priest to
reveal any information obtained during confession.143 The penalty under
the Code for betraying a penitent’s secret is typically
excommunication.144 There are no exceptions to the Seal; thus, all
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with
State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501. In contrast, the Supreme Court’s proposed Rule 506 first laid out
definitions for both “clergyman” and “confidential:”
(a) As used in this rule: (1) A “clergyman” is a minister, priest, rabbi,
or other similar functionary of a religious organization, or an
individual reasonably believed so to be by the person consulting him.
(2) A communication is “confidential” if made privately and not
intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in
furtherance of the purpose of the communication.
FED. R. EVID. 506 (not enacted). The Court then proceeded to suggest that “[a] person has a
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential
communication by the person to a clergyman in his professional character as spiritual
adviser.” Id.
141
Federal jurisdictions, using federal common law, recognize the privilege either
explicitly or implicitly. Pudelski, supra note 103, at 710. All fifty states, however, have
secured some form of the privilege by means of statutory law. Beerworth, supra note 127,
at 105; Jackson, supra note 126, at 1062; Keel, supra note 134, at 683. “These privilege
statutes are driven primarily by a respect for free exercise and church autonomy
principles.” Beerworth, supra note 127, at 105. Today, the clergy-communicant privilege’s
most powerful and important justification is that society views the clergyman-parishioner
relationship as significant and worth fostering. Horner, supra note 134, at 730.
142
See Jackson, supra note 126, at 1058-59. The Seal of Confession is a deeply rooted
Catholic tradition that can be traced back over fifteen hundred years to the times of the
New Testament. Pudelski, supra note 103, at 708.
143
See Pudelski, supra note 103, at 708-09. Some churches view a “[v]iolation of the
seal . . . [as] a ‘crime’ against the Church and a sin against God . . . .” Beerworth, supra note
127, at 106. As such, denominations such as that of Catholics, treat the confessional
relationship as sacrosanct. Id. at 105.
144
Code of Canon Law 983 specifically provides that “the sacramental seal is inviolable;
therefore, it is absolutely forbidden for a confessor to betray in any way a penitent in words
or in any matter for any reason.” The Code of Canon Law c.983, § 1 (1983),
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/_ _P3G.HTM (last visited Dec. 3, 2007). The
Code goes on to state that anyone who breaks the seal can be excommunicated. See
Pudelski, supra note 103, at 708-09 (noting that excommunication is a common punishment
for breaching this sacred tenet); Jackson, supra note 126, at 1059 (discussing the penalty of
exile for violating the seal of secrecy); Beerworth, supra note 127, at 106 (stating, “the
penalty prescribed in most cases is automatic excommunication – a permanent alienation
from the Church and from God Himself”). The significance of the secrecy held in
confession is emphasized in the 1983 revised Code of Canon Law by using the phrase “it is
a crime for a confessor to betray a penitent” as opposed to the 1917 Code, which stated less
stringently that the confessor was “carefully to guard against” betraying the penitent.
O’Brien, supra note 127, at 31.
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confessional matters, as offered to a Catholic clergyman, are held
sacrosanct.145
These deeply rooted Catholic origins of the clergy-communicant
privilege suggest that the privilege applies most directly to those of the
Catholic faith.146 However, there is no clergy-communicant privilege
statute that applies exclusively to Catholic priests.147 Rather, the
language is typically open-ended so as to include the religious functions
and practices of all established denominations.148 This said, some
statutes may provide more protection for some religions than others due
to wording variations in different state statutes.149
There are three main approaches that states take in formulating their
clergy-communicant privilege statutes, ranging from very conservative
to very liberal.150 Generally, clergy-communicant statutes were enacted
Id. “[T]he Code of Canon Law establishes that the Seal is all encompassing and
contains no exceptions. All matters that fall within the Seal of Confession are
sacrosanct . . . .” Id.
146
Pudelski, supra note 103, at 708 (suggesting that, “because in most other religions it
does not violate religious law to disclose confidential information,” the privilege most
directly applies to the Catholic Church).
147
GREENWALD, MALONE & STAUFFER, supra note 138, at § 6:6. The clergy-communicant
privilege, as it exists today, has been extended to protect conversations between clergymen
of non-Catholic religious denominations and their followers. Horner, supra note 134, at
729. “Therefore, while the earlier policy of protecting the Catholic priest’s canonical duties
was applicable only to Catholicism, the privilege as the courts apply it today is equally
applicable to both non-Western and Western religions, as well as established and nascent
Western religions.” Id.
148
GREENWALD, MALONE & STAUFFER, supra note 138, at § 6:6. Other religious
institutions that recognize formal sacraments of confession apart from Catholicism are:
Latter-Day Saints, Eastern Orthodox churches, Episcopal churches, American Lutherans,
Presbyterians, United Presbyterians, the American Baptist Convention, and various Jewish
groups. Beerworth, supra note 127, at 105; GREENWALD, MALONE & STAUFFER, supra note
138, at § 6:1 nn.11-12.
149
Pudelski, supra note 103, at 708. Jurisdictions mainly vary in their definition of who
constitutes the clergy, what the scope of protection afforded to the communication should
be, and to whom the privilege belongs. Jackson, supra note 126, at 1063. There are three
types of clergy privileges: (1) those that specify the religious denominations they protect;
(2) those that fail to specify particular denominations, but still show a preference toward
particular religions through special words like “priest[;]” and (3) those that are neutral
toward all religions. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 126, at 1063; Pudelski, supra note 103, at
711.
150
The three main approaches that states use in implementing clergy-communicant
statutes are the conservative approach, the modern approach, and the broad approach.
Jackson, supra note 126, at 1064. The conservative approach is the narrowest method of
applying the privilege and essentially allows only for the confidentiality of those
communications made under the sacrament of confession. Id. The modern approach is
more liberal in that it protects any communication made to a member of the clergy in the
145
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in response to the need to be able to confide in those entrusted with the
task of providing spiritual solace and advice without fear of reprisal.151
Thus, if a communication is not intended to be confidential, then it is not
in the purview of the privilege.152 However, due to the varying
approaches states have taken, the extent of the scope of what is allowed
to be confidential and with whom differs.153 For instance, many statutes
include communications made for both confessional purposes and those
for spiritual counseling to anyone acting in the official capacity of a
spiritual advisor.154 Furthermore, while the majority of states say that

course of “seeking spiritual counsel or advice.” Id. This approach relieves the court from
having to determine “whether a person was making the communication for the purpose of
receiving forgiveness for their sins” as well as “which religious denominations require
auricular confession.” Id. (quoting Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is it (Past) Time
for a Dangerous Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege?, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1627, 1646-47 (2003)). Lastly, the broad approach protects all communications made to a
clergy member functioning in his or her professional capacity, without any regard to
spiritual purpose. Jackson, supra note 126, at 1064. The variety of communications
protected under the broad approach include: “child rearing advice, employment
counseling, and personal problems such as alcoholism or sexual dysfunction.” Id.
151
GREENWALD, MALONE & STAUFFER, supra note 138, at § 6:1. The pervading result of
such confidentiality is that “harmony with one’s self and others can be realized.” Id.
To carry out their mission of providing spiritual and moral guidance
and succor during times of personal crisis, military chaplains must
develop and keep the trust of those they serve . . . .
. . . If those who are battling loneliness and resentment feel that their
chaplains will have to testify against them about some or all of what
they have revealed in confidence, they are likely to avoid going to
them for solace.
United States v. Isham, 48 M.J. 603, 607 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998).
152
Jackson, supra note 126, at 1062. “Every state requires that the communication in
question must have been made in private, to a clergyman in their professional capacity as a
member of the clergy, and with the expectation of privacy.” Id. at 1064.
153
Some states have expanded the privilege beyond the confessional, to include both
penitents and those persons seeking general spiritual counseling. Pudelski, supra note 103,
at 711; Keel, supra note 134, at 685.
154
See Beerworth, supra note 127, at 105; Pudelski, supra note 103, at 711. In some clergycommunicant statutes, the position of spiritual advisor may be fulfilled not just by those
members of the clergy officially recognized by the church, but also by those individuals
who assist clergy in rendering advice. GREENWALD, MALONE & STAUFFER, supra note 138,
at § 6:6. Nevertheless, some courts have held it necessary that a cleric’s assistant be
regularly engaged in minister-like activities to be covered under the privilege. Id. A few
other statutes contain language specifically applying the privilege to lay individuals
reasonably believed to be a minister by the penitent communicating to him. Id.; see, e.g.,
FED. R. EVID. 506(a)(1) (not enacted), supra note 140. In addition, “depending on the
doctrines of the church involved and on the breadth of the relevant statute, the privilege
may be extended to elders or other lay officials of a church.” GREENWALD, MALONE &
STAUFFER, supra note 138, at § 6:6.
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the privilege belongs to the penitent, there is still some confusion as to
who has the right to invoke the privilege.155
The main function of the clergy-communicant privilege, while wellgrounded in religious and judicial tradition, creates obstacles to the
prosecution of child abuse perpetrators by permitting clerics to withhold
from law enforcement officials valuable information transmitted to them
in confidence.156 Before such obstacles can be removed, analysis of
government intervention with, or abrogation of, the clergy-communicant
privilege in relation to the Religion Clauses must ensue.157
III. ANALYSIS
Sexual abuse of a minor is an evil that the State is permitted, if not
compelled, to regulate for the maintenance of its health, safety, and
welfare.158 Unfortunately, the problem of child sexual abuse has
escalated to epidemic proportions.159 Despite law enforcement efforts to
combat the abuse, states must do more by means of investigating,
prosecuting, and punishing sexual abuse within the religious
Jackson, supra note 126, at 1064-65. Confusion results from some states reasoning that
clergymen have their own Free Exercise right to claim the privilege for themselves too. Id.
at 1065; Keel, supra note 134, at 684. Regardless, the “decision to assert the privilege is
“purely a voluntary decision, and the clergy member or communicant is free to depart
from the religious tenets and to testify.” Pudelski, supra note 103, at 708.
156
See id. at 707-08 (discussing the essential function of the clergy-communicant
privilege). See also James T. O’Reilly & JoAnn M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduct:
Confronting the Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
31, 59 (1994-95) (illustrating one obstacle created by the conflict between mandatory
reporting statutes and the clergy-communicant privilege). For example, a bishop who is
furnished with information pertaining to instances of child sexual abuse and fails to
“comply with state mandatory reporting statutes may also be sued for negligence per se,
whether or not he is criminally charged for the violation. A court could run into
evidentiary conflicts if the priest-penitent privilege were invoked by the bishop regarding
the admissions made by the priest.” Id.
157
See Beerworth, supra note 127, at 99 (“The jurisdictions that have decided to impose a
general reporting duty on clergy have had to further decide whether to extend the duty to
confidential communications with parishioners, or to retain the clergy-communicant
privilege and thereby avoid a direct conflict between God and Caesar.”); see also infra Part
III.A (analyzing the viability of government intervention into religious practices under First
Amendment jurisprudence).
158
See Jackson, supra note 126, at 1073 (stating, “The protection of children is a very
legitimate and important state interest that must be carefully weighed against society’s
interest in protecting and preserving the relationship between a clergy member and a
parishioner.”); see also supra note 98 (discussing the Sherbert court’s limitations on
government restrictions to those that are undertaken for the purpose of protecting public
safety, peace, and order).
159
See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (detailing the statistical nature of child
sexual abuse).
155
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community, in order to achieve both greater protection of children and
more even-handed justice.160 Part III.A analyzes the Religion Clause
jurisprudence and how increased government intervention into religious
institutions’ internal handling procedures would not violate the current
law.161 Next, Part III.B recommends abrogating the clergy-communicant
privilege in the narrowed context of mandatory child abuse reporting
statutes and addresses some of the main arguments in opposition to such
government action.162
A. Religion Clause Applicability to Government Acts Combating Child Abuse
in the Church
The Religion Clause jurisprudence, while unpredictable and
contradictory at times, has been resolute on the notion that the First
Amendment “embraces two concepts, – freedom to believe and freedom
to act,” with the first being absolute and the second being governable.163
Thus, neither Congress nor the states may legislate an individual’s
beliefs, but they are free to prohibit certain religious practices viewed as
detrimental to the best interests of society overall.164 In conformance
160
“State legislatures should act to remove the enforcement hurdles faced by
prosecutors, so that in the future, all of those responsible for the sexual abuse of children
can be held criminally liable.” Russell, supra note 38, at 914.
161
See infra Part III.A (applying current Religion Clause jurisprudence to the question of
feasibility regarding government interventions within religions communities).
162
See infra Part III.B (addressing and refuting the main arguments proponents have for
partially abrogating the clergy-communicant privilege); see also supra note 134 (listing the
contentions opponents have against abrogating the clergy-communicant privilege).
163
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709, 719 (2005); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). Treatment of the tension
inherent between the two clauses and application of the overall goal of the First
Amendment is described as follows:
[T]he Establishment Clause[] commands a separation of church and
state . . . . [T]he Free Exercise Clause[] requires government respect for,
and noninterference with, the religious beliefs and practices of our
Nation’s people . . . .
Our decisions recognize that “there is room for play in the joints”
between the Clauses, some space for legislative action neither
compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the
Establishment Clause.
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719 (internal citations omitted).
164
See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (stating, “Congress was deprived of all legislative power
over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties
or subversive good order.”). But see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993) (invalidating city ordinances prohibiting the ritual slaughter of
animals that contained numerous exemptions for butchers, farmers, and other professions,
making it clear that the law was passed out of stark animosity for the Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye). The Court stated:
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with this spirit, it is reasonable to presume that violations of federal and
state child sexual abuse laws by religious institutions are not only
punishable by law enforcement and judiciary officials, but the failure to
do so is a First Amendment violation in itself.165
The Court in Smith accurately noted that an individual’s religious
beliefs have never “excuse[d] him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”166 Given
that every state in the union, in addition to the federal government,
enacted laws criminalizing sexual abuse of a minor, it logically follows
that the State, having exercised its freedom to regulate, is now free to
break through the veil of religion in enforcing its criminal ordinances
equally among the religious and non-religious communities.167
“[N]either rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond
limitation” by the government; therefore, no religious institution can

The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to religious
tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state
intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices,
all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the
Constitution and to the rights it secures. Those in office must be
resolute in resisting importunate demands and must ensure that the
sole reasons for imposing the burdens of law and regulation are
secular. Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised,
designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices.
Id. at 547.
165
See KURLAND, supra note 25; supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing reverse
discrimination under the Religion Clauses); see also Henriques, supra note 21, at 22
(“Precious as protecting religious freedom is, however, there are cases where these special
breaks collide with other values important in this country – like extending the protections
of government to all citizens and sharing the responsibilities of society fairly.”).
166
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79
(1990). In denying the respondents’ unemployment compensation due to their dismissal
for use of peyote during a religious ceremony, the Court affirmed that it could not “afford
the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every
regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.” Id. at 888. In
further explaining its reasoning, the Court enumerated a variety of generally applicable
laws that advance the overall goals of society and should not be saddled with religious
exemptions but under the most stringent circumstances. Id. at 888-89. These laws include
those governing: compulsory military service, payment of taxes, health and safety
regulations such as punishment for manslaughter, child neglect laws, compulsory
vaccination laws, drug laws, traffic laws, social welfare legislation such as minimum wage
laws, child labor laws, animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and antidiscrimination laws. Id. See generally supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (discussing
the Smith decision).
167
Every state has statutes prohibiting sexual contact with a minor child, as evidenced by
the passage of mandatory reporting statutes. See supra note 129 (listing the mandatory
reporting statutes for most states).
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successfully challenge the application of the general criminal laws
against them.168
Although possessing the right, if not the duty, to hold religious
affiliates to the same legal standards as non-affiliates, both law
enforcement officials and judges have been hesitant in doling out evenhanded justice to the victims of child sexual abuse.169 Preference still
appears to be on allowing the religious institutions to govern for
themselves, by their own bylaws and creeds, as the best means of
remedying an otherwise egregious sin against society.170 The result of
acting like a bystander has not only increased crime due to recidivist
behavior, but also places greater strains on society’s ability to function
effectively, such as an increased strain on family harmony, trauma to the
minor victim impairing later contributions as an adult, and strain on
social welfare programs.171
The tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause, as applied to the question of whether the criminal justice system
should intervene or blatantly override a particular religious institution’s
168
169

Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
See Fain, supra note 9, at 225.
[T]he judiciary is often reluctant to impose liability on the church
regardless of how bizarre the events engendering the claims.
Continued and persistent media focus addressing the issue and
exposing the clergy perpetrators of sexual abuse should exert pressure
on the courts, as well as the churches, to do whatever is necessary to
alter ministerial behavior.

Id.
170
See supra Part II.A (discussing internal church handling procedures and illustrations of
the government’s hesitation to interfere with those procedures in recent incidents of child
sexual abuse). See also O’Brien & Flannery, supra note 127, at 5 (suggesting that abuse of
children sexually is “one of the most egregious situations within society” today).
171
See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165 (“It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole
community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for
growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens.”). Preventing child
sexual abuse is an important societal interest due to the inherent damage it always has on
the victim. National Center, supra note 3. Some of the potential consequences of child
sexual abuse include: lowered self-esteem, suicidal impulses, shock, feelings of shame and
guilt, aggression, eating disorders, increased vulnerability to future attacks, running away,
social withdrawal, anxiety, fear, sleeping disorders, substance abuse, distrust of authority
and authority figures, flashbacks, tendency to be involved in abusive relationships,
offender behavior, feeling hopeless or helpless, difficulty in forming trusting, intimate
relationships, lower likelihood of marriage, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder.
See, e.g., id.; WAYNE KRITSBERG, THE INVISIBLE WOUND: A NEW APPROACH TO HEALING
CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE 56-57 (Bantam 1993); SUSAN MUFSON & RACHEL KRANZ,
STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT CHILD ABUSE 74-75 (Facts on File 1991); DALE ROBERT REINERT,
SEXUAL ABUSE AND INCEST 36-37 (Enslow Publishers 1997).
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preferences when confronting child sexual abuse allegations, is clearly
visible.172 On the one hand, by not applying the generally applicable
criminal law equally to religious and non-religious adherents, the
government is essentially giving preference to religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause.173 On the other hand, too much intervention into
the administrative aspects and general practices of a religious body can
result in a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.174 The question
becomes: how does one reconcile the two clauses?
Both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause allow for
such intervention, due to the State’s interest in maintaining a higher
social norm.175 For example, in applying the Lemon test to a challenged
government action interfering with a church’s normal administrative
policy, the Court would find that interfering to prevent and punish child
sexual abuse serves a secular purpose, its primary effect is not to
advance or inhibit religion, and it does not “foster ‘an excessive
government entanglement with religion.’”176 Similarly, under Sherbert’s
strict scrutiny test, the Court would view any State interference as
advancing a compelling government interest in the most narrowly
tailored manner to effectively achieve the interest of punishing sexual
abuse and preventing recidivism.177
While neither the Lemon test nor the Sherbert test are consistently
applied to Religion Clause cases, the jurisprudence pertaining to such is
unambiguous as to the existence of room in the joints between the two

See supra text accompanying note 87 (discussing the inherent tensions between the
Religion Clauses due to their entwinement). “[E]fforts to protect the free exercise of
religion can clash with efforts to assure that religion is not favored by the government.”
Henriques, supra note 21, at 22.
173
See supra text accompanying note 84 (suggesting that excluding religious adherents
from generally applicable laws is the equivalent of penalizing non-adherents for their lack
of faith).
174
See supra note 87 (illustrating the inherent tension that exists between the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause).
175
See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67 (“The right to practice religion freely does not include
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill
health or death.”); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (implying that
protection under the Religion Clauses applies only to claims rooted in religious belief, not
in religious practice); supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing religious
convictions as inalienable and religious practices as governable).
176
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting, in part, Walz v. Tax
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)); see also supra note 110 (presenting the three prongs of the
Lemon test).
177
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963); see also supra note 96 (explaining the
requirements to meet the strict scrutiny standard).
172
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Clauses in which the government can act.178 Permitting “individuals to
be excused from compliance with the law solely on the basis of religious
beliefs is to subject others to punishment for failure to subscribe to those
same beliefs.” This is an Establishment Clause violation, and reasonable
intervention by the criminal justice system into the internal handling
procedures of a particular religious institution would be permissible.179
Thus, the question shifts to ask: what types of intervention are needed?
B. The Pros and Cons of Abrogating the Clergy-Communicant Privilege
Both the state and federal governments have a tradition of
integrating themselves into the daily lives of their citizens and justify
doing so as being in the best interest and overall benefit of said
individuals.180 Within the criminal realm, the government has taken
proactive measures to not only punish and deter crime, but also to
uncover less visible crimes such as drug trafficking, sale of illegal guns,
and child pornography, in order to prevent future crimes.181 Even sexual
abuse has proven to be within reach of the government’s arm.182 By
extrapolation, then, because it is common knowledge that sexual abuse
does not stop at the churchyard gate, it is not unreasonable to suggest

178
See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719, supra note 163 (discussing the “play in the joints” standard
for determining constitutional validity of government acts); see also supra notes 108, 122
(noting the inconsistent court decisions that arise due to the irregular applications between
the Lemon and Sherbert tests).
179
KURLAND, supra note 1, at 22.
180
Examples of government integration for the overall benefit of its citizens include:
social welfare, Social Security, and Medicare.
181
See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (stating that it is constitutionally
permissible for ownership of child pornography to be criminally punished and that there is
no freedom of speech conflict when it comes to protecting children from sexual
exploitation).
182
Every state has statutes prohibiting sexual contact with a minor child. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 13A-6-69.1 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.434 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405
(West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-405 (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 778
(West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-33.1 (West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1506 (West
2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.249 (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 254 (West
2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-602 (West 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-13 (West
2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-27.7A (West 2006); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6318 (West 2006);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-522 (West 2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.25 (Vernon 2006);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-401.1 (West 2006). For examples of federal statutes pertaining to
sexual abuse of a minor, see: 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2244 (2006); see also supra note 129 (stating that all fifty states have implemented
mandatory reporting statutes to help prosecute child sexual abuse).
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that the government stretch out its arm further by implementing greater
measures to combat such abuses within the church.183
One such measure that should be taken in an effort to combat child
abuse within the church is to universally abrogate the clergycommunicant privilege in pre-existing mandatory reporting statutes.184
While several states have already abrogated the clergy-communicant
privilege in one fashion or another, the vast majority of states have yet to
do so for several possible reasons.185
First, opponents to the abrogation of the privilege, even in the
limited context proposed in this Note, may contend that to do so would
constitute a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.186 However, as
previously discussed, Smith allows for the general application of
religiously neutral laws toward religious institutions.187 Abrogation of
the privilege would not mean that individuals cannot believe in child
sexual abuse, pedophilia, or any other heinous crime, just as the Native
American Church was never told it could not believe in peyote as a
religious item or the Mormons in polygamy as a means of achieving
favor with God.188 Religious beliefs, provided they are sincerely held,
are protected regardless of how extreme or bizarre.189 But alas, believing

183
See supra Part II.A (illustrating the child sexual abuse problem within the church and
how several religious institutions confront it).
184
See supra Part II.C (addressing mandatory reporting statutes); see also supra Part II.D
(discussing the clergy-communicant privilege).
185
See O’Brien & Flannery, supra note 135, at 29 (discussing the number of states that
include clergy into their reporting statutes and the varying manners by which clergy are
incorporated); see also supra note 134 (presenting abrogation opponents’ rationales).
186
See Keel, supra note 134, at 682-83 (suggesting one reason not to abrogate the clergycommunicant privilege is the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).
187
See supra note 102 (discussing the Smith test application on personal religious
practices). A violation would occur under former free exercise precedents because a “child
abuse reporting statute that abrogates all privileges, including the priest-penitent
privilege . . . pressures the clergyman to either adhere to his religious beliefs and accept
criminal sanctions or abandon his beliefs to avoid such sanctions.” See Keel, supra note 134,
at 713. However, under the current Smith rationale, “any free exercise argument would fail
because a child abuse reporting statute that requires all persons to report occurrences of
child abuse and that grants exemptions to no person or class of persons would be viewed
as a neutral law, generally applicable to all.” Id.
188
See supra text accompanying note 100 (examining the Smith holding regarding
whether religious use of peyote could legally be prosecuted); see also supra note 91 and
accompanying text (addressing the Reynolds court’s approach to whether religiously
sanctioned polygamous practices were constitutionally protected).
189
See generally United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (holding that the
government is prohibited from determining whether individual convictions are true or
false and from interfering in people’s right to believe in what they want; however, it is
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in something and practicing it are not always harmonious with the social
policies and rights of others.190 In a society that cherishes freedom and
equality, it is reasonable to assert that everyone is free to believe in the
tenets they choose; however, it is unreasonable and unjust to suggest
that Person A, who is agnostic, should be held to a higher standard of
the criminal law than Person B, who is a well-respected minister.191 The
inequities of permitting freedom of religious practice to reign supreme
are inherently conflicting with the ideals laid out by the Framers.192
Additionally, by not abrogating the clergy-communicant privilege,
the government is committing an Establishment Clause violation by
preferring religion over other testimonial privileges such as the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.193 In cases like these, the flexibility
between the Religion Clauses is critical.194 Moreover, given that the
social policy behind uncovering, investigating, and prosecuting child
sexual abuse offenders is unquestionably compelling, the scale weighs in
favor of avoiding an Establishment Clause violation by abrogating the

permitted to interfere with or place burdens on certain acts performed in conformance with
those convictions).
190
See supra text accompanying note 93 (addressing the danger in permitting individual
religious practices to proceed unrestricted).
191
See Ayers, supra note 94 (suggesting that the concerns and wellbeing of society as a
whole should come first, before the religious interests of individuals).
192
The Constitution opens with a preamble expressly encapsulating the intent of the
Framers:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
U.S. CONST. pmbl. Later constitutional amendments were made to unquestionably breathe
more life into the concept of “securing the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves,” as seen in the
Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; . . . nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
193
The difficulty that arises when abrogating certain privileges is that:
courts do not enforce the prohibitions equally among the various
classes of professionals that are otherwise entitled to assert such a
privilege. Specifically, several states abrogate the psychotherapistpatient privilege, but states retain the priest-penitent privilege in child
abuse cases . . . .
. . . [As a result,] states that have abrogated the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in child abuse reporting statutes and have not similarly
abrogated the priest-penitent privilege may very well have, by virtue
of that fact alone, run afoul of the Establishment Clause.
Keel, supra note 134, at 687-88, 692-93.
194
See supra note 163 (discussing the flexibility built into the Religion Clauses).
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privilege, even at the risk of potentially violating the Free Exercise
Clause by those members of the clergy torn between their religious
tenets and the law.195
Admittedly, at the time the First Amendment was ratified, religious
diversity was minimal and the idea was to create a nearly unbreakable
law to protect the free exercise of religion, but as a practical matter
today, such freedoms of religious practice must be restricted by those
laws that the government has a compelling, religiously neutral, interest
in passing.196 To allow otherwise would open a Pandora’s Box by
allowing individuals to create their own new religions solely to
circumvent criminal laws.197 Not only would this further the rampant
problem of child sexual abuse, but it would create a slippery slope
toward chaos in society as a whole.198 Rather than open the flood gates
to potential social disorder, it is a wiser course of action to start
implementing new laws and judicial measures that may encroach upon
certain religious practices.199

See Keel, supra note 134, at 713 (“[S]uch privileges are not guaranteed by the
Constitution, and states have broad discretion to weigh other interests against the need to
provide for confidentiality.”).
196
See supra note 81 (discussing the minimal religious diversity at the time of the
Founding Fathers); see also supra note 93 (explaining the danger of allowing individuals to
become laws unto themselves).
197
According to the Greek myth, Pandora was molded by the gods under order from
Jupiter, in an attempt to punish mankind for receiving the gift of fire from Prometheus.
LUCIA IMPELLUSO, GODS AND HEROES IN ART 196 (2003). Pandora was given special
qualities from each of the gods, making her irresistible. Id. Jupiter then sent Pandora as a
gift to Prometheus’ brother Epimetheus, who, failing to heed his brother’s warning not to
accept gifts from the gods, accepted her as his wife. Id. Inside the house of Epimetheus,
Pandora found an ornate chest, which she was instructed by her husband not to open. Id.
Succumbing to curiosity, however, Pandora peeked inside the chest. Id. The chest
contained all of the plagues of humanity, which were released upon the Earth once
Pandora opened the chest. Id. Pandora then, by Jupiter’s instruction, proceeded to close
the chest, leaving only hope inside. Id. Additionally, society commonly refers to selfcreated or unorthodox “new-age” religions as cults. WEBSTER’S UNIVERSAL COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 198 (Gramercy Books 1997) (defining “cult” as “a religion or sect considered to
be false, unorthodox, or extremist”).
198
Essentially, not applying neutral, generally applicable laws equally would allow
individuals to become supreme laws unto themselves under the guise of being sanctioned
by their religious beliefs, as feared by the Reynolds court. See generally Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Employment Div. Dep’t. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990).
199
See supra note 137 (discussing how mandatory reporting statutes advance the state’s
interest in prosecuting child sexual abusers and suggesting that clergy members are the
state’s most important resource in achieving that goal).
195
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Naturally, sweeping changes must come in baby steps. While there
is much to be done by means of furthering criminal prosecutions of sex
offenders in the church, the first course of action should be to abrogate
the clergy-communicant privilege so that all clergy may be included
under the mandatory reporting statutes.200 Abolishing the privilege will
protect against clergy members confessing to each other to avoid
prosecution.201 With the privilege abolished for purposes of the
reporting statutes, clergy members will be posed with a choice: whether
it is better to allow a morally corrupt sex offender to go free or
uninvestigated, providing ample opportunities for recidivism, or risk
punishment themselves for failing to report on a congregant or fellow
clergyman.202
A second argument that might be posed by anti-abrogationists is
that the threat of clergy disclosing communications will seriously deter
individuals from either seeking confession or spiritual guidance.203 The
argument continues that the abrogation will actually result in an increase
in child sexual abuse, because those perpetrators who might have sought
spiritual healing will be deterred from doing so, thus never obtaining the
help they require to cease their vicious crimes.204
Furthermore,
See supra note 135 (discussing the states that have already abrogated the clergycommunicant privilege within their mandatory reporting statutes).
201
See supra Part II.D (addressing the history, purpose, and scope of the clergycommunicant privilege).
202
See supra note 133 (noting that the new criminal sanctions give more force to their
mandatory reporting statutes); see also supra note 125 (discussing the difficulty of
discovering and prosecuting child sexual abuse).
203
Jackson, supra note 126, at 1062; Keel, supra note 134, at 683. See generally O’Brien &
Flannery, supra note 127, at 26-29. Members of the clergy hold positions of great power and
trust, thus parishioners commonly turn to them for emotional and spiritual guidance. Fain,
supra note 9, at 211.
Statistics have shown that in times of emotional strain or anxiety, more
people resort to their clergyperson than to other professionals, such as
physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers.
According to a report prepared by the Joint Commission on Mental
Illness and Health, “in times of emotional or domestic trouble,
approximately forty-two percent of individuals consult clergymen,
twenty-nine percent seek help from physicians, eighteen percent
consult psychiatrists or psychologists, and ten percent turned to clinics
or other social agencies.”
Id. at 212 (quoting, in part, Kimberly Anne Klee, Note, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News for the
Good Samaritan or a Blessing in Disguise?, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 209, 219 (1985)).
204
Jackson, supra note 126, at 1069; Beerworth, supra note 127, at 112 (discussing the
possibility that more instances of child abuse will go undetected due to the deterrence from
confessing and seeking spiritual guidance). Society benefits from the pastoral counseling;
consequently, blockading the clergy results in diminished social harmony. Id.; Keel, supra
note 134, at 683. But see Jackson, supra note 126, at 1071 (“Western judicial systems can
200
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opponents may express concern that abolishing the privilege for
reporting purposes will hinder an individual’s ability to cleanse his (or
her) soul.205
These arguments are flawed, however, given that several states have
already begun to recognize the need for requiring religious officials to
report their knowledge regarding instances of child abuse without
experiencing a total breakdown of order or religion.206 Consequently,
there is little reason for all states and the federal government not to
follow suit.207 Although it may be true that some individuals might be
deterred from revealing information to clergy members, they are by no
means prevented from doing so.208 For example, some laypersons may
be deterred from confessing, but if knowledge of their abuse is
discovered through means outside confession, then reporting statutes
would mandate the disclosure of such information.209 Therefore, at least
for those individuals truly of faith, it would remain more beneficial to
confess and obtain spiritual absolution of sin and guilt than not to
confess but still potentially be reported.210 Those who sincerely believe
in the purpose and power of seeking spiritual guidance will not greatly
be deterred or hindered from doing so by knowing that clergy are not

operate without the priest-penitent privilege. No empirical evidence exists to demonstrate
that parishioners or penitents would forgo spiritual counseling or confession if their
communications with the clergy member were not protected by a privilege.”).
205
See Jackson, supra note 126, at 1069. “Christian eschatology holds that failure to obtain
absolution or do penance for one’s sins before death is met with the prospect of eternal
damnation.” Beerworth, supra note 127, at 107. In the Catholic tradition, for example,
confession is only one of seven sacramental pillars; congregants are also expected to make a
full confession at least once annually. Id. at 105-06; 107.
206
See supra note 136 (listing the states that have already abrogated the clergycommunicant privilege in some form or another).
207
See supra note 136.
208
See supra note 151 (suggesting the importance of maintaining confidentiality is to
protect and encourage clergy-parishioner relationships).
209
Any ambiguity that currently exists as to whether something is or is not considered a
confidential communication under a state’s clergy-communicant privilege statute, for
purposes of abiding by the mandatory reporting statutes, would be eliminated by simply
abrogating the privilege altogether.
210
See supra text accompanying note 144 (addressing the sanctity of confidentiality in
confession under the Code of Canon Law); see also supra note 127 (stating that the main
purpose of mandatory reporting statutes is to protect children from the atrocity that is child
sexual abuse).
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only free to, but required to, report learned or suspected knowledge of
child sexual abuse.211
A third concern about abrogating the clergy-communicant privilege
is the privacy interest congregants have in maintaining a confidential
clergy-communicant relationship.212 Opponents might argue that the
privilege was established initially to protect the individual’s privacy
rights; thereby, the abolition of the privilege will lead to the downfall of
individual privacy in the context of religion.213 Indeed, privacy rights
are a crucial element to individual autonomy and should be protected.214
However, this Note does not call for the complete abrogation of the
clergy-communicant privilege in all contexts, but rather just so far as is
necessary to make mandatory reporting statutes more effective in
uncovering child sexual abuse.215 While it is arguably a violation of
privacy for certain communications made in confidence to later be
disclosed, the amount of actual interference in personal privacy by
requiring clergy members to abide by reporting laws is minimal.216 If
governments abrogate the privilege only so far as to require disclosure of
sexual abuse information, then nearly all communications between the

211
See supra text accompanying note 14; see also supra note 133 (discussing the possible
criminal and civil sanctions for those who fail to abide by the mandatory reporting
statutes).
212
Keel, supra note 134, at 683; see also Jackson, supra note 126, at 1070 (quoting, in part,
Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the
Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 769 (1987)) (“The privacy
rationale is based upon ‘each person’s interest in the dignity of privacy for his most
intimate relationships.’”).
213
The statutes encompassing the privilege were enacted in their varying forms in
response to the need for people to be able to confide in those entrusted with the task of
providing spiritual solace and advice without fear of reprisal so that “harmony with one’s
self and others can be realized.” GREENWALD, MALONE & STAUFFER, supra note 138, at § 6:1
(quoting Keenan v. Giagnte, 390 N.E.2d 1151, 1154 (N.Y. 1979)). However, testimonial
“privileges contravene the principle that ‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s
evidence.’” Jackson, supra note 126, at 1061 (quoting, in part, Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 50 (1980)); see also Horner, supra note 134, at 731.
214
See supra note 98 (stating that individuals may not be punished merely for holding
beliefs contrary with or abhorrent to government officials).
215
See supra note 126 (suggesting that mandatory reporting statutes increase the
likelihood that information will lead to prosecution of child sexual abusers); see also infra
Part IV (presenting a model mandatory reporting statute that abrogates the clergycommunicant privilege for reporting purposes only).
216
Only those communications that specifically pertain to child abuse or cause the
suspicion of child abuse would need to be disclosed; thus, only those individuals who
perpetrate such egregious crimes relinquish the right to complete privacy.
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clergy and the communicant would still remain protected, as would their
individual rights to privacy.217
As a last attempt at maintaining the clergy-communicant privilege in
its entirety, anti-abrogationists might resort to using a slippery slope
argument.218 If governments can be trusted, however, then the slippery
slope argument is reduced to logical paranoia.219 It may in fact be true
that once the State is comfortable enough with abrogating the privilege
in one context, there is a risk that it might soon extend further into other
contexts until the privilege is non-existent.220
Nevertheless, this
argument is defective to the extent that exceptions have been carved out
of other evidentiary privileges with little (if any) backlash.221 Also, while
it might be beneficial for law enforcement officials to be able to compel
clergy to report knowledge of theft, homicide, or other criminal acts,
religious communities are not undergoing a current epidemic of such
crimes.222 The heinousness of the child sexual abuse problem, if left to
the current system, will perpetually grow until confidence in the church
is fictional, thereby rendering the need for any form of the privilege
superfluous because people who place no trust in their religious leaders
will not seek confession or guidance from them.223

Id.
Jackson, supra note 126, at 1070; see also supra note 134 (suggesting that antiabrogationists might make a slippery slope argument in opposition to abrogating the
clergy-communicant privilege).
219
See also supra note 134 (presenting some of the potential arguments opponents to
abrogation may make).
220
Id.
221
While not officially enacted by Congress, federal common law privileges, recognized
by the Supreme Court, carve out exceptions for reporting, such as in the husband-wife
privilege. See FED. R. EVID. 505 (not enacted). According to proposed Rule 505, there is no
husband-wife privilege “(1) in proceedings in which one spouse is charged with a crime
against the person or property of the other or of a child of either, or with a crime against
the person or property of a third person committed in the course of committing a crime
against the other, or (2) as to matters occurring prior to the marriage . . . .” Id. at (c)(1)-(2).
Similarly, proposed rule 504 carves out exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege
for communications relevant to proceedings for hospitalizing a patient for mental illnesses,
communications made in the course of a judge-ordered mental examination, or
communications made during the course of a mental examination conducted as a condition
to a claim of self-defense. FED. R. EVID. 504 (not enacted).
222
See supra note 3 (providing statistics documenting the current child sexual abuse
pandemic).
223
See supra Part II.A (presenting illustrations of certain institutions’ internal handling
policies and how they foster recidivism); see also supra note 141 (suggesting the main
justification for maintaining the clergy-communicant privilege is because people recognize
the clergy-parishioner relationship as one worth fostering).
217
218
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It is preferable social policy to prevent people from using confession
or spiritual guidance as a cloak to hide their acts from the justice
system.224 As officials uncover more sexual abuse scandals, it is more
certain that the clergy-communicant privilege cannot be trusted not to be
used as a shield by recidivistic child sexual offenders.
While
perpetrators seek solace in the spiritual guidance and forgiveness of the
church by asking that their guilt or sins be healed for the eternal salvation
of their souls, their innocent victims are left without justice or confidence
in their own spiritual counselors.225 Consequently, the minds (and
possibly souls) of those betrayed child victims are left with little comfort
from either their religious institution or their law enforcement agencies,
while their perpetrators are essentially protected and allowed to repeat a
vicious cycle of abuse.226 Moreover, given how varied the state laws are
in terms of application of the clergy-communicant privilege, it would be
more judicially efficient as well as administratively productive, to
abrogate the privilege entirely when it comes to child abuse reporting.227
Naturally, certain mechanisms should be in place to protect clergy
members and religion, such as limiting the abrogation to child abuse
communications only, maintaining reporter anonymity, and providing
exemptions from testifying.228 Provided the statutes contain provisions
specifically limiting clergy reporting responsibilities, then the
interference with the traditional practices of clergy confidentiality or

224
Employment Div. Dep’t. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990)
(addressing the need to enforce generally applicable laws equally). Generally applicable
laws are just that—generally applicable. Individuals cannot be allowed to hide under the
cloak of religion to avoid the appropriate punishments for a crime; otherwise, they would
essentially be allowed to render their own laws and system of justice, thereby contravening
the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith. Id.
225
“Child abuse is a heinous crime that can scar the mental health of a child for the
remainder of his life.” William W. Blue, State v. Williquette: Protecting Children from Abuse
through the Imposition of a Legal Duty, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 171, 171 (1988); see also supra
note 171 (discussing the traumatizing consequences of child sexual abuse).
226
See supra Part II.A (illustrating the problem of child abuse and the lack of justice many
victims find). In fact, it can be contended that clergy members owe an even greater duty to
children to report abuse than a stranger or professional in a less intimate relationship.
Blue, supra note 225, at 183.
227
See supra note 150 (discussing the different approaches states take in formulating their
clergy-communicant privilege statutes).
228
See infra Part IV (demonstrating how certain protections may effectively be
incorporated into a reporting statute while simultaneously abrogating the clergycommunicant privilege).
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silence is minimal and in accordance with the dictates of the First
Amendment.229
IV. CONTRIBUTION
The clergy-communicant privilege is one deeply rooted in religious
tradition and universally recognized throughout the United States.230 As
a result, many states are reluctant to abrogate the privilege in even
narrowly defined contexts, at the cost of weakening law enforcement’s
ability to uncover, investigate, and prosecute sexual crimes against
minors.231 With careful drafting of the mandatory reporting statutes,
many of the fears that plague those favoring the absolute power of the
clergy-communicant privilege can be surmounted.232 The model statute
below, with commentary, demonstrates how certain measures can be
incorporated into current reporting laws so that clergy members can aid
law enforcement officials while simultaneously reserving some
protections for their positions as religious leaders.233
(1) For the purpose of this statute, persons mandated to
report shall include but not be limited to a: physician,
surgeon, resident physician or intern, osteopathic
physician, nurse, medical examiner, dentist, dental
hygienist, teacher, coach of intramural or interscholastic
activities, school principal, school personnel, social
worker, guidance counselor, coroner, child-caring
personnel, chiropractor, optometrist, emergency medical
technician, paramedic, health professional, mental
health professional, psychologist, pharmacist, peace
officer, probation officer, parole officer, member of the
clergy, Christian Science practitioner, or priest, or any
organization or agency for any of the above, who knows
or has reasonable cause to believe that a child is
dependent, neglected or abused, regardless of whether
229
See infra Part IV (demonstrating how certain protections may effectively be
incorporated into a reporting statute while simultaneously abrogating the clergycommunicant privilege).
230
See supra Part II.D (exploring the history of the clergy-communicant privilege).
231
See supra Part III.B (addressing the main concerns with abrogating the clergycommunicant privilege).
232
Id.; see supra note 134 (outlining some of the arguments that may be made by antiabrogationists).
233
The model statute is a combination of provisions and language used by several states
in their existing reporting statutes. The proposed amendments are italicized and are the
contribution of the author.
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the person believed to have caused the dependency,
neglect or abuse is a parent, guardian, person exercising
custodial control or supervision or another person, who
has attended such child as a part of his professional
duties.234
Commentary:
Section one specifically incorporates clergy members with the other
professionals included in the non-exhaustive list typically found in
reporting statutes. The language uses both priest and clergy member,
denoting that the statute is inclusive of all religious officials, regardless
of denomination.235
(2) Any person who knows or has reasonable cause to
believe that a child is dependent, neglected or abused, or
may become subjected to dependency, neglect, or abuse shall
immediately cause an oral or written report to be made
to a local law enforcement agency or the ____ State
Police; the cabinet or its designated representative; the
Commonwealth’s attorney or the county attorney; by
telephone or otherwise. Any supervisor who receives
from an employee a report of suspected dependency,
neglect or abuse shall promptly make a report to the
proper authorities for investigation.236 All such reports
must remain confidential unless the person consents
otherwise. A member of the clergy, Christian Science
practitioner or priest who has received a confidential
communication or a confession in that person’s
professional capacity in the course of the discipline
enjoined by the church to which the member of the
clergy, Christian Science practitioner or priest belongs
may not withhold reporting of the communication or
confession. This includes not only communications or
confessions but also personal observations the member of
the clergy, Christian Science practitioner or priest may
otherwise make of the minor.237 Nothing in this section is
The list of professionals is adapted from: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030(2) (West 2006);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101(b) (2006).
235
See supra text accompanying note 135 (discussing the types of reporting statutes and
the primary methods for including clergy within their scope).
236
Excerpted from KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030(1) (West 2006).
237
Adapted from ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(A) (West 2006).
234
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meant to preclude any person from their obligations to report
abuse or neglect.
Commentary:
The inclusion of the phrase “may become subjected to” in section
two allows the statute to serve as both an investigative tool for
prosecutors and law enforcement officials and as a preventative
measure. In this capacity, individuals who know of or suspect a person
of committing a prior offense and know of or foresee incidents in the
near future that they reasonably believe may lead to child abuse should
report the person. The statute also contains a provision designed to
protect the confidentiality of the sensitive material disclosed as well as
the anonymity of those disclosing it. Preserving anonymity avoids
tarnishing the clergy’s reputation, thereby preserving the trust necessary
to continue counseling parishioners. If parishioners continue to confide
in their clergy, then more opportunities to discover instances of child
sexual abuse arise.
Section two also contains a specific provision officially abrogating
the clergy-communicant privilege in the limited context of reporting
abuse. The emphasis that clergy are required to report, despite any
privileges encapsulated in their roles as clerics, protects against any
confusion clergy members, congregants, and law enforcement officials
may have as to the extent of the statute’s reach. The statute also
underscores the principle that all knowledge of child abuse, not just that
which is obtained in confessions, must be disclosed.
(3) A person who complies with section (2) of this provision
and furnishes a report, information or records to the
appropriate enforcement agency shall be immune from any
civil or criminal liability by reason of that action unless
the person acted with malice or unless the person has
been charged with or is suspected of abusing or
neglecting the child or children in question.238
Commentary:
Section three rewards immunity for reporters, thus providing an
essential incentive for clergy members to comply. If torn between
reporting on a communicant and risking retribution in the form of civil
suits from said individual, a clergy member might otherwise choose
238
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silence, consequently defeating the purpose of the statute by allowing
potential offenders to go unreported and uninvestigated.239 Providing
immunity also prevents people from reaping financial benefits through
civil suits merely because others complied with the reporting laws.
(4) In any civil or criminal litigation in which a child’s
neglect, dependency, physical injury, abuse, or
abandonment is an issue, a member of the clergy, a
Christian Science practitioner or a priest shall not be
examined as a witness concerning any confession or
communication made to him in his role as a member of
the clergy, a Christian Science practitioner or a priest in
the course of the discipline enjoined by the church to
which he belongs. Nothing in this subsection discharges
a member of the clergy, a Christian Science practitioner
or a priest from the duty to report pursuant to section (2)
of this provision.240
Commentary:
The noteworthy provision in section four is the testifying exemption
offered to clergy members. The exemption is significant not only
because clergy members will likely be more willing to report abuse if
they do not fear courts compelling them to testify publicly, but because it
maintains their anonymity as guaranteed above in section two.
(5) A person who violates section (2) of this provision shall
be guilty of at least a class 1 misdemeanor unless it is
judicially determined that the offense necessitates elevating the
crime to a class 6 felony.241 Additionally, a person who
violates section (2) of this provision may be civilly liable for
negligence per se to the child or children in question.
Commentary:
Section five instills life into the statute by providing criminal and
civil penalties for failing to abide by the dictates of section two. Use of
the word may in regards to the imposition of civil liability protects those
individuals who are charged under this section for failing to report
239
See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose for implementing
mandatory reporting statutes).
240
Adapted from ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(L) (West 2006).
241
Adapted from ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(O) (West 2006).
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suspected cases of future abuse. In those instances, the trier of fact
should first determine whether the accused had sufficient knowledge of
suspected future abuse before deeming him civilly liable. Although the
possibility of civil liability in such situations might require more judicial
resources to resolve, it would also encourage clergy to report reasonably
predicted child abuse cases, thereby increasing the probability that a case
is investigated. The potential to save a child from the life-long trauma of
sexual abuse outweighs preserving judicial resources.242
V. CONCLUSION
Sexual abuse of a minor is a monstrous crime, repugnant to the
social fibers of the United States, and yet, it is a crisis that has infiltrated
both the home and the chapel. States have already taken measures to
combat such crimes against our youth. Regrettably, however, these
measures too often fail to breach the churchyard gate, thus allowing a
considerable number of child abuse incidents to go uninvestigated and
unpunished. Government officials appear to be content in entrusting
individual religious institutions with the task of seeking out and
eliminating such sexual deviations within their borders. This tactic,
unfortunately, has been counter-productive in the fight against child
sexual abuse.
The religious protections ensured by the First Amendment have
played a role in governments’ reluctance to intrude upon the autonomy
of religious institutions. This hesitation to intervene is unnecessary,
however, because current Religion Clause jurisprudence allows for
generally applicable, facially neutral criminal laws to be applied equally
to the secular and non-secular realms of society. Moreover, the states
have an undeniably compelling interest in eradicating child abuse and
prosecuting abusers.
Consequently, amending current mandatory
reporting statutes to abrogate the clergy-communicant privilege for the
narrow purpose of reporting suspected abuse would be a
constitutionally acceptable step toward penetrating the veil of religion
used to conceal sexual abuse problems within the church. State
legislatures and law enforcement officials “must not rely on the church
to change itself; tragically, victims and their families have already made
that mistake.”243

242
243
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Russell, supra note 38, at 915-16.
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Think back to the hypothetical scenario from Part I when the parents
greeted their sixteen-year-old daughter at the airport only to discover
that she was the unwilling mother of a clergyman’s child.244 By enacting
a mandatory reporting statute that abrogates the clergy-communicant
privilege, these parents may now have a viable legal remedy to the grave
transgression committed against their daughter. Although nothing can
fully compensate victims of child abuse, the hope that justice will be
served and the cycle of abuse broken may bring some relief and healing
to these children and their families.
Julie M. Arnold245

244
See supra Part I (presenting a hypothetical illustration of the tragedy and prevalence of
child sexual abuse within the church).
245
J.D. from Valparaiso University School of Law (2008); B.A. in English from Valparaiso
University (2005). I would like to thank the following people for their tremendous help in
guiding this Note: James Loebl, J.D, MBA, LLM; Derrick A. Carter, J.D.; and Rosalie B.
Levinson, J.D. I would also like to thank my parents, family, and friends for their constant
love, support, and late night encouragement, without which this Note would not have been
possible.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

